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Higher education is at a crossroads. In the U.S. especially, the question of what role 
education should play in greater society continues to come up. Should education be about 
fundamentally developing the predispositions or skills of an individual so that he or she 
can be a more effective citizen later in life? Or should education merely function as a box 
to check off, a kind of rite of passage that, regardless of quality or content, is required of 
an individual on the way to becoming part of some “real world?” These issues are 
quickly moving to the forefront for students and scholars alike; no longer relegated 
behind closed doors at faculty meetings, these issues are coming to define the very 
institutions that question them. It is the goal of this thesis, then, to address these shifting 
goals for, and horizons of, education through a rhetorical lens. From this perspective, 
education functions as the text under consideration. Rhetoric as it is understood for the 
majority of this project can be seen in the social interactions that take place, typically 
between the individual student and his or her educational environment. The core theme 
 viii 
that runs throughout this thesis is that learning is not something that solely takes place 
through formal education, nor is it about acquiring mere common sense; rather, it is a 
natural extension of human curiosity to wonder about and explore the world of which we 
are all a part. It is the responsibility of schools and universities alike to facilitate students 
in developing who they are as a part of this bigger picture. To this end, I introduce the 
term “inhabited learning.” Inhabited learning elaborates on why one’s learning 
experience in formal education is still so important: In an age of information we all need 
some way of making sense of the myriad facts and figures we encounter in our everyday 
lives, with the hope of being able to make better sense of ourselves in the process.  
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Higher education is at a crossroads. In the U.S. especially, the question of what 
role education should play in greater society continues to come up. Should education be 
about fundamentally developing the predispositions or skills of an individual so that he or 
she can be a more effective citizen later in life? Or should education merely function as a 
box to check off, a kind of rite of passage that, regardless of quality or content, is 
required of an individual on the way to becoming part of some “real world?” While 
schools involved in the initial stages of education, such as elementary or middle schools, 
continue to struggle with these questions (especially regarding teaching students what 
they “need to know” to pass their classes and socializing them to the supposed “way 
things work” after formal education has ended), institutions of higher learning are taking 
strides toward addressing the growing disparity between the school and society. What’s 
more, these issues are coming to the forefront for students and scholars alike; no longer 
relegated behind closed doors at faculty meetings, these issues are coming to define the 
very institutions that question them. A large part of the problem is the age old struggle 
between theory and practice, which, while it traditionally has played out between 
academics who prefer one approach to research or study over the other, has more recently 
spilled over the walls of the college campus and into greater society. A major implication 
of this development is that as “thinking” and “doing” have continued to be drawn in 
opposition to one another, interests outside of academia have started to influence the safe 
space of the ivory tower. Some arguments say this is a good thing; why should 
professional educators have a monopoly on knowledge, especially in a democratic society 
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where that knowledge directly equates to power? Other arguments, mainly those coming 
from individuals within the academy, are discouraged at how outside pressure for funding 
and abstract learning outcomes have become paramount to imparting valuable skills to 
students, or pursuing new frontiers of thought through research. In this sense, the college 
or university campus as a sanctuary for exploring new ideas or testing the social waters 
before becoming part of the work force has been replaced by the school as a kind of 
market-driven knowledge industry. 
 It is the goal of this thesis to address the latter concern about the shifting goals for 
and horizons of education. While this project does not single out education as “higher” or 
“lower” in any particular sense, that is done so for a reason: although the different stages 
of education may focus on teaching particular things to the student, anything that is 
taught, regardless of when it is taught, necessarily modifies the student’s life experience. 
Put another way, how and what students learn, even early on, can have a dramatic impact 
on not just what but how they continue to learn throughout their lives. The core theme 
that runs through this thesis, then, is that learning is not something that solely takes place 
through formal education, nor is it about acquiring mere common sense; rather, learning 
is a natural extension of human curiosity to wonder about and explore the world of which 
we are all a part. And it is the responsibility of schools and universities alike to facilitate 
students in developing who they are as a part of this bigger picture. For the purposes of 
this project, this is learning. 
Unfortunately, this is not enough. Upon closer examination, one begins to realize 
that the issues and questions currently facing education today are not new; they have been 
around for years and, in some cases, centuries. Part of the solution, then, might be to 
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more closely examine education’s past in the hopes of better understanding its present 
situation. The take away here is not to merely import what may have worked in the past 
into present circumstances, but rather, through the hindsight that we are afforded, learn 
from our past mistakes in the hope of multiplying present successes.  
But even this may not be enough. Even if one materializes from the ether a perfect 
plan for satisfying the demands of academics and greater society by redefining the role of 
education in this or that way, other individuals may still lack the driving force or impetus 
for pursuing that program or realizing it completely. This is where rhetoric comes in. 
Though typically understood by those who do not teach or preach the discipline of 
rhetoric professionally as rules for speaking properly, or even as a means of impressing 
friends and colleagues at a cocktail party, rhetoric has the potential to be much more. To 
start, rhetoric can be understood as persuasion. This is the definition that, when watered 
down too much, tends to be bent into either of the two previous examples. Those 
individuals who pursue this simple, truncated iteration of rhetoric are often only 
concerned with drawing attention to themselves or winning arguments. But as a study of 
various acts of persuasion, rhetoric can help us to ask more serious questions: What 
message is an author of a given text trying to get across to his or her readers? What 
implications does a given text have on a community or society, both in the author’s own 
time but especially in our time? What cultural or societal values are translated or negated 
through a given text? How can what seems like the densest theory be transformed to 
direct practical activity?  
 For this project, education functions as the “text” under consideration. Why do we 
formalize education as a school or other institution? Should it be the responsibility of the 
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teacher or student (or both) to ensure that learning in these environments happens “as it 
ought to?” Who decides how learning “ought to” happen in the first place? Is it 
something that should be decided during a faculty meeting, by a board of directors, or by 
the individual student him or herself? And so, while the way a particular author or 
individual speaks or an audience’s reaction to a speech or book will not be directly 
engaged here, rhetoric still plays what is perhaps a more vital role in sorting out a 
possible goal for education. Rhetoric as it is understood for the majority of this project 
can be seen in the social interactions that take place, typically between the individual or 
student and his or her educational environment. An environment can be any location or 
situation in which a student has the opportunity to learn, from the home to the school to 
greater society. The bottom line is that learning cultivates the individual’s ability to 
interact socially, through what he or she reads, talks about with others, or experiences in 
some other way.  
 To the end of elaborating on that point, this thesis is divided up into three 
chapters, all of which address some particular aspect of the function of education in 
society, why what is going on now will not work, and potential directions to take toward 
solving those problems. In Chapter 1 I begin where most of the Western world does with 
inquiries about the nature of thought more generally: that is, with the Greeks. In 
particular, I focus on the work of the ancient Greek philosopher, sophist, and educator 
Isocrates, who is often overlooked in favor of more popular minds such as Aristotle or 
Plato. One reason why Isocrates tends to get overlooked is that very little of his work has 
been preserved, but that also means that we are able to immerse ourselves in his thoughts, 
allowing for what I believe is a more personal connection with this philosopher. He also 
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had a particular concern with education in his own time, one that he tried to address, like 
Plato, in the creation of a school where Isocrates was able to implement his educational 
program or paideia. Isocrates is relevant from a rhetorical perspective as well, since his 
paideia not only encouraged individual ability, but also began to direct students toward a 
notion of something greater than themselves, what is often referred to as Isocrates’ 
project of panhellenism. But while Isocrates provides an invaluable starting point for this 
exploratory study of how rhetoric can redefine education, what I refer to as educative 
rhetoric, a more modern mind is needed to bring the role of education home regarding its 
ability to help shape and mitigate more contemporary social concerns. 
 In Chapter 2, I turn to the work of the American philosopher, educator, and 
pragmatist John Dewey. Renowned for his work in reforming public education in the 
U.S., especially in the early part of the 1900s, I see Dewey as expanding on Isocrates’ 
project of panhellenism in order to realize education as an integral part of the complex 
whole of human experience. Taking the turn of the century and the subsequent turn to 
modern science as his cue, Dewey proposes that the scientific method offers a way of 
getting at not only how we describe our experience as human beings, but how we can 
make the most of such experiences. This is learning for Dewey, where, while each 
individual has his or her own repertoire of prior experiences that inform a new 
experience, there are ways of bettering experience in general that are applicable to 
everyone. In a sense, Dewey envisions learning as something that we as human beings do 
naturally. The goal of formal education, then, is not to attempt to cram the facts, figures, 
customs, or traditions of yesterday into the student’s mind today; instead, education 
should be concerned with cultivating individual ability to the point where we can begin to 
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make the most of our experiences for ourselves, both within the classroom and without. 
The rhetorical perspective that I believe Dewey offers is that, in becoming more aware of 
our own experience, we simultaneously realize that our experience is not wholly our own; 
in fact, it is informed by (as well as informs) the experiences of others with whom we 
interact in our community. Determining the means of making these interactions more 
beneficial for ourselves, others, and ultimately our common society becomes the goal of 
what I define in this chapter as pragmatic rhetoric. 
 Finally, Chapter 3 asks the following question: While the best learning 
experiences seem to be the ones where we feel like we bring something new to the table 
or conversation already in progress, what does our capacity for thinking in new ways 
mean for things like social change and progress? The take away here is whether or not we 
can avoid the pitfalls that often stymie change, such as closed-mindedness, in favor of a 
way of thinking more conducive to rhetorical invention. Understood as how we 
manipulate and ultimately create our communicative context, rhetorical invention 
illuminates how language not only affects us and how we perceive ourselves or others, 
but also how, by transforming our perception of language, we may be able to transform 
our very society. This chapter also addresses the rift between opposing points of view 
that often develops in what we might consider any “good” debate today, by examining 
the nature of dialectic. While dialectic is a popular method of critical analysis among 
academics, it is introduced here as a component of the everyday arguments that revolve 
around (or devolve to) one-sided thinking. In such an instance, dialectic often leaves us 
with more questions than answers, an amalgamation of fragmented viewpoints rather than 
a more definitive solution or plan for action. I conclude Chapter 3 with a discussion of 
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one possible path down which education could be redirected, toward what I refer to as 
inhabited learning. Inhabited learning elaborates on why one’s learning experience in 
formal education is still so valuable, especially today. In an age of information we all 
need some way of making sense of the myriad facts and figures we encounter with the 
hope of being able to make better sense of ourselves in the process. And I believe 


































This research project will attempt to establish a foundation for talking about the 
role of rhetoric in shaping education. While the “hows” and “whys” of education 
certainly seem to be on the minds of most scholars and many students today, I believe 
that the role rhetoric has to play in this conversation needs to be clarified. I turn to the 
work of the ancient Greek philosopher and teacher, Isocrates, in order to explore how his 
contributions shape the question of how best to formulate an educative rhetoric; that is, a 
rhetoric not concerned with accumulating knowledge or winning arguments, but a 
rhetoric focused on the integration of that learned knowledge with everyday life. 
Isocrates’ work is an ideal place to start because, unlike the work of many of the 
figureheads of ancient Greek philosophy such as Plato or Aristotle, Isocrates is typically 
aligned with the sophists. Though the sophists as a group are often misunderstood, 
starting with Isocrates allows me to occupy the middle (and as will be seen later, 
pragmatic) ground between rhetoric and philosophy. The goal here is to demonstrate that 
even 2,500 years later, the rhetoric of the ancient sophists may in fact have a great deal 
more value to offer the academy today than academia’s traditional perspective of the 
sophists tends to admit. This is not to say, however, that the rhetorical practices of 
Isocrates should be imported without modification; rather, I believe that defining 
Isocrates’ insights on civic education, broad learning, and encouraging individual interest 
and ability as the means of education may help to redirect us as scholars to a very 
important end of education: to bridge the gap between theory and practice, between the 
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academy and greater society. To this end, the work of Isocrates will be used to frame 
what educative rhetoric as a program of teaching and learning could look like, while I 
will turn to the work of the pragmatists, especially John Dewey, in Chapter 2 in order to 
further explore the next logical step: if educative rhetoric is successful, what best 
practices should the citizen enact in his or her life?  
 The role of rhetoric in this project will be to locate the junction of theory and 
practice, where rhetoric will be defined generally as the skills or habits of communication 
necessary to aid us in practical problem solving in relation with others (practice) through 
everyday meaning making (theory). While this definition may ultimately prove too broad, 
it accomplishes the important task of setting the rhetoric of education apart from critical 
rhetoric or rhetoric as public address. This chapter is divided into five main sections 
which explore the following: Isocrates’ rhetoric, his educational pedagogy, the practice of 
declamation, the individual’s rhetorical training, and the intersection of education and 
citizenship. But first, some background on Isocrates is necessary. 
A BRIEF BACKGROUND ON ISOCRATES 
The easiest way to start talking about the rhetoric proposed by Isocrates in his 
educational program is to distinguish it from what it was not. Though often depicted as 
being caught in the middle between the philosophy of Plato and the rhetoric of the 
sophists, Isocrates tries to strictly delineate his work. On the one hand, Isocrates’ 
philosophia, the perspective on thinking that informs his educational program, or paideia, 
is not exactly akin to the truth-seeking philosophy of Plato; on the other hand, though 
unlike the sophists in several ways, Isocrates’ teachings still tend to be lumped together 
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with their work. Yet, rather than hurting Isocrates’ educational program, this duality 
actually helps, especially since it allowed him to draw on the best of what both other 
worlds and ways of thinking had to offer.  
The sophists were perceived as silver-tongued teachers of speech who traveled 
throughout ancient Greece, making grand promises to the people they encountered. These 
sophists claimed that they could essentially teach anyone to talk circles around one’s 
fellow citizens, even to the point of counseling one on how to dominate with a weak 
argument. Of course, the sophists also suffered ill repute for charging a fee for their 
services (Fredal 2008). Although paying for education is commonplace today, it was 
unheard of at the time, and looked down upon in ancient Greece. In fact, even in many 
academic circles today, this negative opinion persists and tends to be cast over all 
sophists and their practices, including Isocrates. But the real value of the sophists lies in 
realizing that these practices heralded the institutionalization of education, exemplified in 
Isocrates’ establishment of a school in which he imparted his rhetorical training.  
Isocrates further distanced himself from the sophists through his sense of 
community. According to John Poulakos, “in the case of the Sophists, the primary 
function of logos is critical. In this capacity, it often operates so as to create a crisis by 
casting doubt on and overthrowing the established realities…In the case of Isocrates, the 
principal function of logos is constructive…Insofar as it can shape social reality, logos 
works so as to build necessary institutions and create human communities held together 
by commonly shaped beliefs” (2004, 74). For Isocrates, then, the heart of logos (a 
reasoned opinion or account), was a sensibility to be able to emphasize commonality with 
others, while also being able to meet them on their own terms. In this way, his 
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educational practice, his paideia, saw its culmination in the everyday cultural interaction 
between individuals of a community, and “[i]n this context, the identification of rhetoric 
with ‘philosophy’ and ‘culture’ is not only understandable, but essential. Democracy is 
primarily a form of speech that cannot be spoken by any one person. It can be learned 
well only amidst many voices” (Hariman 2004, 226-227). 
By instilling his students with a sense of community, Isocrates succeeds again in 
distinguishing himself from the other sophists, who saw the mindless masses as there to 
be manipulated. But practicing an educational program that emphasized the role of the 
individual as a member of the community also distanced Isocrates from Plato and the 
philosophers. As Ekaterina Haskins puts it, “[u]nlike Plato, Isocrates does not condemn 
the aesthetic dimension of rhetoric. It is not the power of the spoken word he questions, 
but the unrestrained pursuit of individual gain to the detriment of the collective good of 
the demos, which has become the dominant type of rhetoric in the courts and the 
assembly” (2004, 92). Isocrates thus presented his rhetoric as something good for the 
whole, opposed to both the philosophy of Plato, which concerned itself with the 
possession of wisdom by an elite few, and the rhetoric of the sophists, which was 
concerned with the power of the individual to mislead or confound the masses. 
DEFINING ISOCRATES’ RHETORIC 
The first major distinction that Isocrates makes in his own educational program is 
between rhetoric as a science and rhetoric as a kind of inventive endeavor. Isocrates 
adamantly argued that there cannot and should not be a ‘science’ of rhetoric, since such a 
stringent system would rob rhetoric of its creative potential. As Jeffrey Walker puts it, 
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“Isocrates famously argues against the notion of…an ‘ordered art’ or ‘science’ consisting 
of fixed prescriptive rules, and stresses instead the notion of discourse production as a 
‘creative act’” (2011, 62). This notion of a creative act significantly delineates Isocrates 
from the other philosophers or sophists, since it implies a degree of originality of thought, 
rather than randomly stumbling upon hidden truths in the former case, or learning by 
heart examples through imitation used to stylistically manipulate others, as is the case for 
the latter. 
Thus the virtue and wisdom which Isocrates imparted through his rhetorical 
training had its value in its applicability to everyday life; he was not concerned with 
imparting obscure knowledge, but rather focused on teaching his students to live better. 
In order to drive this point home, Isocrates established himself in the precarious position 
between the philosophers and the sophists, the very position that his students would learn 
to adopt. David Depew and Takis Poulakos explain that “[a] hallmark of Isocratean civic 
education is that it recast philosophy as rhetoric precisely in order to introduce an 
element of reflective, aesthetic deliberation into the discussion of rhetorical training and 
practice” (2004, 2). This reflectivity was central to Isocrates’ paideia, since it required 
that throughout all their studies, his students be working toward learning to think for 
themselves in practical situations. The reflective quality of Isocrates’ teaching also 
explains how he was able to borrow from both Plato and the sophists, the great minds of 
his time, in order to establish his own brand of rhetorical training. 
Isocrates suggests that the value of this type of rhetorical training lies in the 
ability of its teachings to awaken and strengthen the creative capacity of the individual. 
This capacity can be better understood as one’s ability to be discerning both in judging 
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the discourses of others as well as in producing one’s own discourses. Discourse here can 
be defined simply as communication, the transmission of one’s thoughts into words that 
are exchanged with others. Yet this process is far from simple. In fact, Isocrates makes 
the following observation: 
[Y]ou will find among those who are unable to create or say anything of value, 
but are past masters in criticizing and prejudicing the works of others, some who 
will say that all this is spoken ‘prettily’ (for they will be too grudging to say 
‘well’), but that those discourses are better and more profitable which denounce 
our present mistakes than those which praise our past deeds, and those which 
counsel us what we ought to do than those which recount ancient history. 
(Antidosis, 221)  
Thus, while it may prove difficult, the rewards are great for the individual who learns 
from the past in order to creatively position him or herself toward the discourses that he 
or she encounters in the present. 
 In so doing, the individual becomes a diligent thinker and speaker, flowing 
effortlessly form one to the other. Isocrates explains that these qualities make up the ideal 
citizen, one who carefully examines every situation or what is said in any instance, acting 
in moderation to determine the best possible response or means of engagement. However, 
even citizen-scholars, as the apogee of public intellectualism, are susceptible to the draw 
of power so flaunted by the other sophists. The problem then becomes that the scholar 
may speak of moderation and due diligence in discourse, but in practice he or she no 
longer heeds his or her own advice. Isocrates echoes this concern, writing that, “we are 
all so insatiable in discourse that while we prize due measure and affirm that there is 
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nothing so precious, yet when we think that we have something of importance to say, we 
throw moderation to the winds, and go on adding point after point until little by little we 
involve ourselves in utter irrelevancies” (Antidosis, 359). The goal of Isocrates’ rhetoric, 
then, is to maintain the precarious balance between thought and action, self and society, 
past and present experience. 
Isocrates accomplishes this in his rhetorical program by giving his educational 
pedagogy one main end: to teach the individual citizen to become well acquainted with 
past thoughts and deeds in order to become more attuned to the present moment. The 
Greeks define this sensibility to time and place as kairos. Attunement to kairos becomes 
the goal of Isocrates educational program in rhetoric; as he puts it, “I hold that man to be 
wise who is able by his powers of conjecture to arrive generally at the best course, and I 
hold that man to be a philosopher who occupies himself with the studies from which he 
will most quickly gain that kind of insight” (Antidosis, 335). Isocrates’ educational 
program, his paideia, is thus concerned with equipping individuals with discerning and 
steadfast judgment, especially with regard to their communicative interactions. 
ISOCRATES’ PAIDEIA 
The most useful way of understanding Isocrates’ rhetoric is as a pedagogy with 
practical purpose. This is contrasted with a rhetoric defined in terms of hard and fast rules 
of speech to be painstakingly followed, or methods for manipulating the unaware. From 
this particular perspective, “Isocrates is anything but a Sophist. He demands reflection 
and deliberative choice, not unthinking response” (Depew & Poulakos 2004, 9). Seen 
here is the common thread of the importance of individuality that runs through Isocrates’ 
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paideia. This is not, however, to be confused or confounded with a stubborn 
individualism, in which all people are little more than a fragmented humanity, disparate 
parts almost entirely isolated from one another; instead, Isocrates emphasizes the 
individual for the very purpose of putting the pieces back together. In order to succeed at 
this purpose, Isocrates writes that the individual “must, first of all, have a natural aptitude 
for that which they have elected to do; secondly, they must submit to training and master 
the knowledge of their particular subject, whatever it may be in each case; and, finally, 
they must become versed and practiced in the use and application of their art” (Antidosis, 
293). In this way, Isocrates teaches individuals to appreciate the unique qualities in 
themselves, their own ways of thinking and acting in the world, in order to better 
appreciate the particular qualities and potential contributions of others. 
Interestingly enough, the need for a connection between theory and practice 
proposed in Isocrates’ educational program is still very much a salient topic for education 
today. The current debate in academia between theory and practice seems like a relatively 
new occurrence, especially given the changing needs of schools. The reality, however, is 
that we continue to struggle with the same questions about theory and practice that 
Isocrates encountered in his day. Isocrates, however, proposed that theory and practice be 
brought together in the following way. He writes of the teachers in his own school that 
they “set [students] at exercises, habituate them to work, and require them to combine in 
practice the particular things which they have learned, in order that they may grasp them 
more firmly and bring their theories into closer touch with the occasions for applying 
them” (Antidosis, 291). Ideally, then, theory and practice should work in harmony.  
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Yet the connection between these two aspects of education that Isocrates strives 
for continues to elude scholars today. Steven Mailloux writes that, “What has become 
central in contemporary debates over critical theory, political philosophy, and educational 
policy are the questions of whether there are any necessary political consequences to 
rhetoric or pragmatism or sophistry and whether the structural or constitutive bonds 
between rhetorical pragmatism and cultural politics have any specific ideological 
content” (1995, 16). Or, as Josiah Ober puts it, the issue at hand is “the problematic unity 
of theory and practice, the question of what purchase philosophy broadly conceived 
might have on how we (as the subjects and objects of rhetorical practice) do and should 
act in the real world” (2004, 39). Thus the take away from the Isocratean approach to 
theory and practice is that, in order to be truly useful, one’s learning should not merely be 
connected to the ends of classroom study; instead, learning should flow freely between 
theory and practice, allowing what one learns in the classroom to impact what one learns 
out in the real world and vice versa. The school and the community not only should be, 
but need to be connected for Isocrates. As Edward Schiappa explains, “[Isocrates] 
advocated an active role in the polis through which wisdom is put to the service of the 
common good, and that is what he and his students did their best to do” (1995, 55). 
However, while the Isocratean approach to education may seem a bit too idyllic for more 
critical academic veterans today, that is no reason to just cast it aside. Yet a multitude of 
voices may still arise asking what worth a 2,500 year old educational program has today. 
But Isocrates would remind us that we will never know for sure unless we first hear what 
it has to say. While many scholars rail against the decay of education, they fail to commit 
themselves to even listening to any new proposed path of action for fear of the change it 
 17 
might bring. As Isocrates shows, the past is directly implicated in any attempt to improve 
the present or even the future. His inclusion of the practice of declamation in his 
rhetorical training further shows how the past and present should always be working 
together in education. 
THE INTERDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE OF DECLAMATION 
The next question is how this new educative rhetoric, built upon the foundations 
of Isocrates’ educational program, should work. Isocrates emphasizes the need for 
students to be familiar with multiple exemplary discourses, to both be exposed to them 
but also to learn from them what works best. In order to obtain this broad familiarity with 
various educated thoughts, “the student must read widely and critically in the ‘celebrated’ 
authors, a list that would come to include not only poets and sophists but also orators, 
historians, and philosophers. This work is part of the dual project of cultivating character 
by expanding the student’s intellectual horizon and learning the ideai, the fundamental 
elements of rhetoric” (Walker 2011, 73). Thus Isocrates’ paideia focused heavily around 
an interdisciplinary notion of education. It was only by seeing the connections between 
great thinkers of the past that students could hope to make connections for themselves. 
To this end, Isocrates’ paideia began with students familiarizing themselves with 
the works of great authors. This was not in an attempt to encourage students to copy 
directly what had come before, but rather to establish in their minds examples of best 
practices. These ideai would eventually be used by the students to inform, but not define, 
their own opinions and ways of seeing the world, their doxa. Takis Poulakos writes that, 
“Unlike the Sophists, who had addressed the question of how an orator might best define 
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or undermine a given doxa, Isocrates bracketed persuasion and focused instead on the 
issue of formulating the best doxa possible” (2004, 53). In order to better understand 
Isocrates’ rhetoric today, notions of persuasion and public address as the core of rhetoric 
need to be set aside. In fact, Isocrates may have been advocating for a kind of education 
in rhetoric more akin to what we most often practice today, rhetoric as reasoned 
competence and measured perspective in communication. It is this kind of rhetoric that I 
consider to be educative, where rhetoric takes on the role of a tool used to enhance one’s 
dexterity in thinking and in deliberation. 
 Isocrates’ educative rhetoric works in the following way. According to Walker, 
“Beyond this preliminary getting ‘familiar/ experienced’ with the ideai, there is, as 
Isocrates says, a second, and crucial, stage of training in which the student practices 
‘selecting’ which ideai should be used for particular ‘cases’ (pragmata, ‘actions/ 
affairs’)” (2011, 74). These first stages of rhetorical training can be summed up in the 
practice of declamation, where students would practice reading aloud ancient speeches in 
an effort to get a better sense of the particular kairos with which each was imbued. This 
practice also helped Isocrates’ students to then complete the third stage of their education, 
in which students began to incorporate their own originality into the various ideai that 
they had learned. It was when all of these pieces came together that Isocrates’ paideia 
could really be said to work, insofar as the individual scholar had become more attuned to 
kairos. In this way, “Isocrates could cast political deliberation as a process of aiming at 
the right course of action in the face of uncertainty, and doxa as a conjecture aimed at 
making the right decision” (T. Poulakos 2004, 52). In essence, then, the ideai taught by 
Isocrates and the doxa developed by his students had a twofold benefit: first, for the 
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individual’s own competency; second, for the greater thought of the community, where 
the influence of one was always flowing into the other, from the individual into the 
established, traditional thoughts of the community and back again. 
THE INDIVIDUAL IN RHETORICAL TRAINING 
Once they learn what constitutes the theories or methods of rhetoric, students 
reflect on what they learn in given practical situations in order to inform their own sense 
of kairos. The goal of this part of Isocrates’ paideia is to “enable a better grip on the 
present by bringing onto a given situation the full weight of perceptiveness and 
insightfulness that had been accumulated over time. Experience with the past increased 
the awareness of possible outcomes in the future; it enabled one to look beyond the 
immediate situation, explore in advance all potential avenues, and anticipate how events 
might turn out” (T. Poulakos 2004, 54). Again, this translates into ideas like 
interdisciplinarity today, where Isocrates’ “notion of rhetorical invention as a ‘creative 
process’ that involves selecting and combining ideai to meet the needs of particular 
occasions suggests that he regards genres as mixable and malleable” (Walker 2011, 94). 
It is then up to the individual to decide how those various ideai are mixed and matched in 
order to establish the best possible educational structure given his or her particular 
disposition  
 In a sense, Isocrates’ paideia is not about imparting a fully-fleshed out 
prescription of educative knowledge. Rather, it functions as a framework which is 
molded to the person and personality of the individual student. Thus, “Paideia can only 
work with and improve what exists already, and what exists already sets the limits of 
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what can be achieved. But in those with the right aspirations and a proper work ethic, 
even with small talent, a great deal can be achieved” (Walker 2011, 122). It is incorrect to 
assume, then, that Isocrates’ paideia is a kind of free-for-all in which the students take to 
their studies on a whim. Paideia is, at least for Isocrates, about providing a structure that 
is flexible enough for those students who have the wherewithal and sense of self to 
recognize how that particular educational program can work not only for them, but 
through them; they are the key to completing the educative process.  
 The student assents to enter into an agreement with the teacher in which the 
experiences of both play a crucial role in Isocrates’ educative rhetoric. Rather than the 
teacher simply telling the students how to act, the teacher presents the students with 
examples through which the students figure out how best to act for themselves. That is, 
“in civic education the successful reproduction of the teacher’s instruction cannot occur 
without being somewhat different from the teacher’s own example…Because a process 
of literal imitation is not useful, students have to not only acquire expertise but also learn 
to use it according to the standards of opportunity, propriety, and originality, which in 
turn are resources for civic leadership” (Hariman 2004, 223). In this way, the 
interdisciplinarity inherent in Isocrates’ rhetorical training not only equips the student to 
deal with the multiple perspectives present in formal educational settings, but also the 
myriad opinions and points of view that he or she will encounter in greater society. 
EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP 
In general, education can, and in many instances does, function as an end in itself. 
But Isocrates’ educational program offers much more. As a civic education which views 
 21 
individuals as active political agents in society, Isocrates’ rhetorical training functions at 
two levels. First, it positions the individual as an important part of a greater political 
community. Second, it emphasizes the creative capacity of human beings to transform the 
political landscape, both on a micro level in terms of how they think about politics, and at 
a more macro level in terms of how they approach the political conduct of their societies. 
To the end of better understanding where Isocrates is coming from with his approach to a 
civic education that spans both society and the classroom, some brief historical context 
may be useful. 
 The ancient Athens of Isocrates was one in which democracy had but only 
recently been instituted. This new form of government began to suggest that the people 
should play a role in political life, though the degree of participation was still somewhat 
restricted. However, democracy nevertheless put a spotlight on the value of a citizen’s 
words and deeds, hopefully directed by well-reasoned thought. That is, “[t]he growing 
democracy made knowledge claims valuable to the citizen as well as to the scholar” 
(Mailloux 1995, 5). It became a crucial goal of Isocrates’ education, then, to mold 
students who could benefit society. Isocrates also addressed the role of the people in 
democracy more directly through his project of panhellenism. After years of infighting 
among the various Greek city states, Isocrates believed the only way to restore Greece to 
its former glory was for everyone to essentially learn to get along. This went beyond 
merely tolerating the other city states and emphasized a genuine appreciation of the 
common Greek culture shared by all. As Poulakos writes, “Isocrates found himself in a 
dispersed culture, one plagued with the ills inherent in excessive individuation—
conflicting claims and competing interests. His reaction to this state of affairs manifested 
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itself in a rhetoric pointing away from the periphery and towards a center” (2004, 82). 
Today, this perspective can be taken by scholars in academia, especially rhetoricians, to 
direct the goal of their teaching back toward affecting change in the ‘real world,’ while 
simultaneously realizing that, in so doing, their work is just as real.  
 It was not merely enough for Isocrates to teach individuals that they are an 
important part of a larger community. The goal of his paideia was to make them better 
citizens by making them more active citizens. The rhetoric that Isocrates taught, then, 
was not one of preparing speeches for the Athenian assembly nor drawing up lengthy 
defenses in the courts of law; rather, Isocrates set before himself the project of “[m]aking 
students wise, in the sense of enabling them to direct the polis to new possibilities of 
human progress” (T. Poulakos 2004, 61). The wisdom in this approach to civic life lies in 
how it empowers and incorporates all individuals as part of the process of political 
change. Yet Isocrates does not seem to believe worthwhile change can or should be 
accomplished through merely struggling up the ladder of political power or stooping to 
manipulation; instead, he advocates for political action on the individual’s own terms. 
The individual thus creates a kind of political sphere of his or her own from which to act 
out into the greater political landscape of the community. According to Depew and 
Poulakos, “if it were possible to participate in the affairs of the polis by taking a step back 
and by distancing oneself from the assembly, then we must also see that distance and that 
step as the creation of a new space that transformed political deliberation proper—and, as 
a result, put in place alternative notions of civic education” (Depew & Poulakos 2004, 6). 
The take away here is that Isocrates’ program of civic education taught individuals to be 
unafraid to remake politics as a source of strength and unity, not weakness and division.  
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A similar lesson can be applied to the role of rhetoric in political action, where 
rhetoric can function as an effective means of bringing about change rather than a means 
of covering up or glazing over the real issues at hand. For rhetoric in particular, where 
much of what we encounter or do in our everyday lives is defined as political in some 
way, how to be more aware amidst a cacophony of political discussion and deliberation 
becomes essential. One might wonder how individuals can acquire the necessary 
resources that are needed in order to be critical actors in their society: in a word, 
education. Isocrates’ paideia cultivates in students the resources to enunciate virtue when 
tyrants or institutions of myriad sorts work so vehemently against the individual 
specifically or against any kind of change more generally. This is the practice that 
Isocratean rhetoric builds toward through its theory. Isocrates explains that the 
individuals who see this process through, from studentship to citizenship, will “never 
speak without weighing their words, and so are less often in error as to a course of 
action” (Antidosis, 347). In terms of political action, then, the student of rhetoric is one 
who does not just make a show of being engaged in the political world or bemoans the 
loss of some “true” politics; rather, he or she is one who exercises critical judgment 
through a well-reasoned perspective.  
While this first quality of Isocrates’ ideal citizen parallels what rhetorical studies 
tries to do today, there is another quality that begins to mark Isocrates’ departure from 
more traditional ways of thinking about rhetoric: the idea that the virtuous student has a 
duty to also be a moral citizen. That is, while “Isocrates is certainly capable of 
distinguishing between political success and moral worth…the unity of philosophy and 
civic virtue, mind and soul, and speech and thought in his writing suggests that Isocrates 
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would attribute unsound discourse to unsound intellect…Isocrates believes that moral and 
intellectual development are closely linked; training his students to think/ speak nobly 
encourages them to be noble” (Schiappa 1995, 47). The politically engaged citizen is one 
who acts with a sense of noble purpose. The focus here is not that Isocrates advocates 
training elites who believe themselves better than their fellow citizens; he instead thinks 
that the ends of education should be teaching and empowering individuals to be unafraid 
to appreciate their own power in affecting the world around them. In so doing, the citizen 
not only learns to better understand and exercise his or her own power, but also learns to 
arouse the potential for action that he or she sees in others.  
Both well-reasoned action and a driving moral purpose lay the foundation for 
what is ultimately Isocrates’ civic education. The value found in that program for the 
politics of today is that it can give us pause amidst a flurry of uncritical speech where 
anyone thinks that their voice carries the banner of truth. Even among socially engaged 
academics, the “first citizens” of societal change, it is often all too easy to lend an ear to 
those discourses which they favor most without giving heed to any other thoughts that 
may differ from, let alone contradict, their own. As citizens, academics can also fail to 
live up to their responsibility when they put the majority of their efforts into criticizing 
those who put forward new ideas simply because they either cannot come up with any 
themselves, or because they are too afraid to enact change. Lastly, these citizen-scholars 
may follow the theory of Isocrates’ rhetoric to the letter, but throw due measure to the 
winds for the sake of hearing their own voices above all others. Thus, while Isocrates 
emphasizes the role of the individual in politics today, he does not raise it on a pedestal; 
instead, his paideia teaches us that all individuals should be valued, just as the student 
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should learn to keep his or her mind open to multiple ways of seeing and acting 
politically in the world. As Haskins puts it, “Isocrates’ rhetoric is not locked into a 
predetermined political path, but constitutes the condition of possibility for an ongoing 
pluralistic democracy” (2004, 90). The goal of Isocrates’ civic education, then, is to 
encourage the ability of his students to arrive at the most sound course of action, to form 
the best possible habits both as a scholar and as part of a greater community. 
COUNTERCLAIMS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Though I have spent the majority of this chapter defending the value of Isocrates’ 
paideia as a model for an education that is practically oriented, his philosophy is not 
without its drawbacks. While it is easy enough to accept Isocrates’ teachings at face value 
as the means to encourage civic mindedness in the classroom, that same goal can 
potentially run into some problems, especially as its implementation is followed through 
on after formal education ends. What can arise is what Kathryn Morgan refers to as a 
kind of inconsistency. This inconsistency creeps up in a few ways in the Isocratean 
paideia; for example there is not always parsimony between his theory, and his own 
practice as a rhetorician or philosopher. Morgan writes that, “in spite of his breadth of 
vision, Isocrates’ educational project is undermined by his engagement with the very 
rhetoric to which he owes his success…he himself is a product of the city’s education in 
Athenian culture” (2004, 146). That is, although it is easy to see how Isocrates is 
encouraging “good” rhetoric that will somehow turn society around, he himself cannot 
help being a part of that society and its aims in the first place. While this does not mean 
that Isocrates is simply writing for his own renown, it is worthwhile to caution that a 
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large part of his program as a philosopher trying to find a place for rhetoric is to convince 
people that his way is somehow better than what is already out there. As Morgan puts it, 
“I believe that we cannot so easily rid ourselves of the tension between consistency and 
opportunism, for this is a tension that lies at the heart of Isocrates’ educational mission” 
(2004, 150). 
 Another way in which inconsistency may be a factor in Isocrates’ paideia is with 
regard to its “audience,” the students or people of Athens. There are moments where as 
good as what Isocrates has to say may sound, it seems difficult to execute an educational 
program based around cultivating the abilities inherent in every individual student; how 
can mass education possibly work for such a diverse group? Morgan suggests that, “By 
personalizing the city, [Isocrates] makes it easier to apply to it personal principles, to treat 
it as a single entity with which he can enter into an educational relationship. The model 
enables him to sidestep a potential problem in applying his ideal of consistency, that one 
cannot educate the mass of citizens the way one can a private pupil” (2004, 139). While 
the group may be diverse, however, Isocrates acknowledges that its members face a 
common problem: namely that culture or society which they hold in common. This is not 
to suggest that commonality itself is the problem (after all, this is precisely what Isocrates 
is working toward through his project of panhellenism), but rather there are better and 
worse kinds of association. For Isocrates, then, “The crowd is cast as the most important 
educator of the young. Since it is the teacher, it is also the corruptor. The crowd, 
however, cannot be a philosopher and will always disapprove of philosophy” (Morgan 
2004, 130). This is why teachers like Isocrates are needed, to reeducate the populace 
away from their traditional ways of thinking about the world and how they interact in it.  
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However, there seems to be one final inconsistency in the role of the teacher here. 
What place does the teacher have in a society where individuals are governed by society 
and accordingly act as they ought to? That is, if each individual looks after him or herself 
and carries that appreciation out with them into the world, what use is there for a teacher 
in a society that effectively learns to maintain its own right course of development? 
Morgan suggests that “Although it would have been easy for Plato and Isocrates to assert 
that their perceived unpopularity was a simple matter of unschooled ignorance, they do 
not exercise this option. Instead they magnify their problem by suggesting that people 
have been educated into ignorance and prejudice against them” (2004, 133). Here, 
Isocrates seems to be undermining his very own position as a teacher or expert who can 
help get society back on track. But I think the key take away is that, even if a self-
regulating society of mindful, rational citizens is the endgame, there is little chance of 
achieving that end without a teacher to get the ball rolling or education to catalyze that 
process in the first place.  
 Aside from potential inconsistency between Isocrates’ own theory and practice, 
one other issue may arise in trying to wholeheartedly implement his work as an effective 
educational program. Eugene Garver explains that this other distinction may be seen in 
how rhetoric as it is defined for the teacher does not totally map onto rhetoric as it should 
be practiced by the citizen. He writes that, “The Sophists were torn between two concepts 
of rhetoric, a neutral one which they, as specialists, were uniquely prepared to teach, and 
a culturally constitutive one that is the property of all citizens” (2004, 188). Thus, while 
the rhetoric which Isocrates professes is supposed to be the kind of thing that everyone 
can practice, there are certain people who need to keep the good rhetorical society on 
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track. Garver further problematizes this point, asking “How are a generally shared 
competence and a particular expertise compatible? How can something both be useful for 
a variety of purposes, and also contain its own ends and values, or at least be oriented to 
good social ends?” (2004, 188). That is, how can an educational program meant to 
transform society lie in the hands of a few select individuals? In the first instance, 
rhetoric is seen as having the ability to change social life for the better by making the 
individuals who make up that society into better citizens. In the second instance, the 
program seems to dictate that a very particular kind of person has to be the one to open 
the eyes of the many and suggest a program of educative rhetoric in the first place. In the 
latter case, rhetoric is seen as an end in itself, a tool for teaching; in the former case, 
rhetoric is a means to some greater social good. But as Garver puts it “for Isocrates the 
instrumental and the civilizing aspects of rhetoric coexist, and a practical art of rhetoric 
exists, when doing well and speaking well are identical” (2004, 189). That is, while these 
two aspects of Isocrates’ paideia may be useful taken on their own, they are most 
effective when taken in concert.  
The fact that these issues may arise is evidence for why Isocrates alone cannot 
“solve” the question of rhetoric and education for us today. This is not to downplay the 
relevance of Isocrates’ thought, however. Even years after his time, great rhetoricians 
have continued to turn their attention toward the question of education. For example, the 
great Roman orator Quintilian built upon Isocrates’ work. Though Quintilian did not 
attribute as much significance as Isocrates did to individual ability, Quintilian did 
emphasize how critical it was for the teacher to know how to impart the right kind of 
knowledge to pupils as future citizens. To do this, Quintilian proposed an approach to 
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teaching that strived to achieve what he saw as the end of all education: moral virtue (the 
relationship between education and morality will be explored further in the next chapter). 
Richard Lanham has described this notion as “The Q Question” of rhetoric and education, 
which asks “Is the perfect orator…a good man as well as a good orator?” (1993, 155). 
According to Lanham, how one goes about answering this question fundamentally 
changes the role rhetoric can play in the educative process. 
The idea that rhetoric has some part to play in the moral well-being of the 
community, then, certainly did not just disappear after Isocrates’ time. While Quintilian 
was also unable to “solve” the Q Question of his own time, he still made important 
strides toward driving home the important role that rhetoric has in cultivating the good 
citizen. Donald Clark explains that “[t]raining in rhetoric cannot alone, or with other 
educational helps, make a youth prudent, temperate, courageous, and just, but it fails in 
its traditional educational duty if it does not throw its weight in favor of these cardinal 
virtues. Teachers may be assured that some measure of success will follow” (1957, 265). 
By adapting educative rhetoric to the needs of future citizens in the present, Quintilian 
seems to suggest, along with Isocrates, that those individuals will be prepared to 
determine the best course of action for their society. As Clark puts it, “The traditional and 
still valid justification is that free discussion by speakers and writers will enable the 
citizens to discover those probabilities most likely to be near the truth and by ‘the powers 
of conjecture to arrive generally at the best course,’ as Isocrates put it” (1957, 265). For 
both Quintilian and Isocrates, then, part of the answer to redefining educative rhetoric lay 
in shifting its focus from a content-oriented program to a program that is skills-oriented. 
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Fortunately, the work of John Dewey will serve to further illuminate this point from a 



















Chapter 2: Cultivating Communication through Associated Living: 
Deweyean Pragmatism and Societal Learning 
 
Educative rhetoric plays a pivotal role in shaping an individual’s learning 
experience in more traditional education, yet it is the first step in a two-part program. As 
chapter one shows, the first part of this rhetorical program involves strengthening 
individual abilities, an emphasis that is evidenced in even the earliest work on rhetoric, 
such as Isocrates’ writings. This is the responsibility of educative rhetoric, where an 
educational program is built around the needs and predispositions of the individual 
student. Put another way, the rhetorical focus here is on personal problem solving skills 
for negotiating meaning from a first-person perspective. While educative rhetoric does 
point toward the individual as part of a greater whole (especially as seen in Isocrates’ 
project of panhellenism), the focus of ancient educative rhetoric remains on the student as 
a singular citizen. And so, the second part of this program involves actually transferring 
those individual ways of perceiving and thinking to the world beyond the classroom. 
Here, the developmental component of educative rhetoric can be realized as part of a 
greater communal whole, understood through the more social component supplied by 
pragmatic rhetoric. While a great deal of work has been done on pragmatism, rhetoric, 
and other facets of communication (Crick 2004, Danisch 2007, Stob 2011), there still 
seems to be a niche to be filled with regard to rhetoric’s relationship to pragmatism and 
education. Thus, the responsibility of pragmatic rhetoric for this project is to insure that 
those individuals whose minds and abilities are cultivated through their experiences in 
formal education follow through in that process, which entails carrying over the skills 
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learned in school to the rest of society. In this way, the individual becomes a more 
effective citizen of the society of which he or she is an integral part.  
 To this end, I look to the work of John Dewey in order to better understand how 
to connect the kind of learning that takes place in formal education with the learning that 
comes from practical activity engaged in by the citizens of a society in order to foster 
social progress and innovation. Dewey is uniquely situated to address these concerns for 
several reasons, put best by Larry Hickman, who writes that, 
Because of his rich treatment of concepts and hypotheses as instrumental, his 
insistence that there is a commonality of human life and that our understanding of 
it is grounded in the biological and anthropological sciences, and his commitment 
to a hard-headed notion of referentiality, Dewey's American, broadly-
experimentalist philosophy avoids some of the central problems of both the 
Anglo-American analytic tradition and French-inspired postmodernism (and its 
neo-pragmatist American cousins). Why is this approach to philosophy 
distinctively American? The answer to this question lies in its treatment of 
concepts as instruments that are malleable, but not infinitely so…and in its 
commitment to the hands-on, rough-and-tumble engagement with stubborn facts, 
especially those having to do with social problems, in ways that treat analysis as 
but one phase of concrete problem solving and not as an enterprise sufficient unto 
itself…and in its insistence on a philosophy that is democratic in its methods and 
outlook because it is committed to a pedagogy that lies at the heart of democratic 
life and the continual reform of democratic institutions. (2009, 2) 
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Thus, Dewey’s approach encourages an encounter with the real world informed by an 
understanding that what we tend to think of as educational life and real life are actually 
part of the same continuous experience. The antithesis to this point typically has been to 
suggest an age-old demarcation between life of the mind and “real life.” But I hope to 
show that, when enacted properly, the learning experience does not have to simply be 
about one or the other. What I propose instead is the two-phase approach to a continued 
learning experience, to which I briefly alluded above. To put it simply, Isocrates instructs 
how to make educative experience practical for the individual, while Dewey 
demonstrates through pragmatic rhetoric how practical experience can be educative for 
all of an individual’s relationships in and to society. This chapter will be divided into five 
main sections, all concerned with parsing out some aspect of pragmatic rhetoric as it 
pertains to realizing the potential of citizens and their society in an effort to get at the 
most effective communication possible. These sections include a brief background on 
Dewey and his pragmatist point of view, an overview of how formal education can be 
separated from social life, the kind of learning environment needed to foster growth, the 
development of habits of reflective inquiry, and finally the melioristic relationship that 
can when learning is understood as both the ends and means to something more. But first, 
some brief background will be given on Dewey and the social context that defines his 
perspective, as an educator and a pragmatist, and the value that a rhetorical reading can 
have when it comes to shedding a little light on the sometimes dark and dusty 
relationship between the school and society. 
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JOHN DEWEY, PRAGMATISM, AND EXPERIENTIAL ENCOUNTERS 
Like my incorporation of Isocrates into the first part of this study, I turn to Dewey 
because, despite his having lived and inhabited a world separated from our own, the 
issues he faced concerning the role of education in society as well as his ideas to combat 
those issues still ring incredibly clear today. Turning his attention to focus on education 
in the early 1900s, Dewey found himself in a society fraught with insecurity; in an 
increasingly industrialized age, the traditions and customs of yesterday no longer sufficed 
in a 20
th
 century world. While industrialization brought with it numerous changes to the 
social landscape of how individuals interact with and relate to their communities, Dewey 
may be said to be predominantly concerned with two aspects in particular. First, there 
resulted a kind of cultural apathy from this fast-paced way of living. The world became a 
quantifiable one rather than a qualitative one, where producing more quickly came to 
outweigh producing higher quality; as society shifted toward a concern with economic 
exchange, social exchange seemingly suffered. Second, society came to be dominated by 
a language and consequent culture of generalizations, wherein it was more often than not 
easy to lose minute or complex glimmers of self or identity in the shuffle of the masses. 
But the greatest challenge to the ways of the past lay in the rise of modern 
science. Since the mid-1800s, modern science had come into its own as a method for 
empirically documenting the natural phenomena of the world. Dewey came to perceive in 
the scientific method a means of rooting out the more ossified beliefs and practices in 
many areas of society, but education seemed especially in need of some kind of 
reconstruction. Rather than taking traditional knowledge about how education should 
work as his starting point, Dewey elects to use an approach that looks to nature and how 
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we engage with and encounter it. Put another way, Dewey starts with the interactions that 
we human beings have with our world and one another. However, this is not to suggest 
that somehow importing or forcing the subject matter of the sciences on education as a 
whole was the answer; rather, Dewey thought that the kind of objectivity offered by the 
scientific method might provide a strong starting point from which the problems with 
formal education could start to be seriously addressed. What’s more, Dewey believed this 
endeavor was paramount, since he saw education as the key to a successful 
transformation of society.  
Taking a cue from modern science, Dewey began his inquiry into the relationship 
between society and education at the level of the experience. That is, “Dewey took his 
point of departure in interactions taking place in nature, where nature is itself understood 
as a ‘moving whole of interacting parts’” (Biesta 1994, 10). This notion lies at the heart 
of Dewey’s pragmatism, a philosophical perspective which essentially looks at the 
interactions that occur in the world and postulates about their potential effects, both for 
the present and also for the future. This way of thinking about the world translates over to 
the interactions between human beings as well. Yet, unlike Isocrates, Dewey would not 
suggest that we as individuals come to our environment with everything we need to make 
the most of what we encounter.  
The qualities that Dewey does grant human beings at the outset function more as 
starting points from which our understanding grows as we act or react toward something 
encountered in our environment. That is, “[w]e do not need to have information about 
‘the world’ before we can act in it. As living organisms, we simply are always already 
active; we simply are always already in transaction with our environment. This does not 
 36 
mean, of course, that we do not learn as a result of our transactions with the world. The 
whole idea of experience is precisely that we undergo the consequences of our ‘doings’ 
and that we change as a result of this” (Biesta 1997, 14). These various “doings” are what 
make up our individual experiences. For Dewey, an experience is not merely some 
isolated event or series of events; rather, our experience is always in flux, always 
modifying or being modified by another more immediate experience. In fact, “[t]he 
inclusive and integrative nature of Dewey’s notion of experience is better captured by the 
word ‘life’…Experience reveals a practical arena, an objective world modifying and 
being partly modified by human actions and sufferings. Experience includes customs, 
institutions, disease, knowledge, death, potentialities, victories, defeats, etc.” (Pappas 
1997a, 533). This is why I believe that Dewey’s experiential method can serve as the 
foundation for pragmatic rhetoric, because rhetoric is concerned with understanding the 
very particular motivations for why and how we as human beings act and interact in and 
with the world. 
For Dewey, while having any kind of experience affects us, determining how that 
experience affects us can help us enhance the quality of that and future experiences. To 
this end, I slightly modify Dewey’s understanding of experience by introducing the term 
“experiential-encounter” in order to focus on the actual exchange that takes place in a 
given interaction among individuals, others, and society. Understanding Dewey’s 
pragmatic notion of experience in this way reveals the truly complex and interwoven 
nature of all the different entities that impact and make up each of our unique 
experiences. Put another way, our experiences are the result of various particularities 
coming together to interact in a given place or time. 
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Consequently, this means that the experiential-encounter is not something that can 
be defined in advance for every individual in every situation.  But while the outcome of 
this encounter may certainly be different for each individual, the everyday act of 
experiencing that takes place is common to anyone; a different life story may be told to, 
or more appropriately by, different individuals, but those stories are but chapters to a 
greater human story being simultaneous shared and created. As Pappas puts it, “The 
direct materials of first-hand experience are meanings that might be conditioned by our 
history. Nevertheless, they are immediately present (given) in the form of qualities and 
relations…They are testable and subject to revision and correction by further inquiry. In 
other words, experience as method relies on what is experienced, but what is experienced 
not only changes but can be modified and improved by the same method” (1997a, 525). 
While the experiential-encounter may hold some particular value on its own, the greater 
value is only realized when we begin to consider the interconnections and potentialities 
for meaning that make such an individual experience and future experiences possible. 
Pragmatists tend to see the individual as being crucial to pragmatism's success, 
especially insofar as more pragmatic experience-valuing individuals make for a more 
pragmatic community.  Of course, this distinction of the individual from “society” has 
caused countless discussions and disagreements about the role of the individual versus 
the role of the group, or personal freedom versus the well-being of the greater good. Yet 
pragmatism itself may provide the very solution (or perhaps more accurately, dissolution) 
to this precarious balancing act between the individual and society, which so much of 
education seems caught up in today.  
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 Thus, the pragmatic goal of helping individuals make better connections in their 
everyday lives requires something more.  It requires more structure than would be found 
in the personal preferences of an individual but also not so much structure as to fall prey 
to being potentially smothered by the educational institution.  An overall framework is 
also needed to buffer this project against being disregarded as overly relativistic, a 
perspective which would reduce the quality of learning from being “something for 
everybody” to being “anything for anybody.”  As Kosnoski puts it, “As individuals begin 
to evaluate arguments in the context of a ‘wider span of particularities,’…they become 
more likely to sympathize with their fellow deliberators’ expressions and use this 
“enlarged mentality” when constructing deliberative solutions… although increased 
sympathy does not automatically negate real differences in interest, it can, when coupled 
with rhythmically generated interest in conversation, motivate participation in 
deliberations that might otherwise flounder in the face of confusion and disagreement 
(2005, 664). A solution, then, may lie at the very pragmatic point that exists between the 
individual and the community. But it is first necessary to develop a greater understanding 
of the relationship that parallels that of the individual and community; that is, the 
relationship of the school to society in terms of the school’s isolation from social life. 
THE SCHOOL’S ISOLATION FROM SOCIAL LIFE 
Dewey suggests that three main concerns arise from the school’s isolation from 
everyday experience: “(1) subject matter and practical living become separated, each 
being treated as though it were an entity; (2) then the subject matter tends to become 
superficial, with no correspondence to life situations; (3) until finally the subject matter 
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becomes so remote that there is not even the possibility of applying it to our living” 
(1973, 192). The great problem here is that, though typically drawn in opposition to one 
another, the resources of the school can often be invaluable in addressing the needs of 
society, and vice versa. And this problem is not a uniquely American one. Even in his 
lectures in China, Dewey asks, “How many times do we witness the spectacle of things 
being emphasized in the school long after they have ceased to be relevant to social needs. 
And, conversely, how often is it the case that something sorely needed by society it 
totally neglected by schools” (1973, 186-187). Consequently, part of the answer to this 
problem by many Chinese activists was to embrace the usage of Paihua, a vernacular 
language that made important discussion about politics or education more open to the 
general public (Dewey 1973, 6). In addition, Paihua also mirrors the concept of paideia 
introduced by Isocrates in chapter one. In both instances, in order to establish better 
schools and a better society, the first step is to realize that the two are inherently linked 
and are dependent upon one another. 
Unfortunately, education as ordinarily practiced often fails to encourage the kind 
of learning needed to facilitate lifelong learning; it fails to emphasize the value of that 
learning as not only an experience in itself that is useful to the individual while still in 
school, but also as a resource which an individual can draw upon in his or her future 
experiences. This can happen in a few ways: generally not converting knowledge learned 
in school to learning outside the classroom; not considering students’ predispositions to 
learning material; or focusing only on artificial ends like exams or grades. In each case, 
formal education somehow alienates students from the activity of learning and 
consequently from themselves. The act of learning is then jettisoned into the realm of 
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abstract social relations, losing any trace of the source of meaning for the student and his 
or her unique sense of self. But David Downing notes that, even with regard to the 
individual self, “Dewey understood that a ‘student’ was always socialized and 
acculturated such that individual ‘interests’ were not merely idiosyncratic differences” 
(1995, 189). Thus the separation imposed to delineate between the school and society is 
merely an artificial one; the reality is that an individual is always being shaped by what or 
whom he or she encounters in either world. 
In the worst case scenario, then, Dewey explains that “It is possible for the mind 
to develop interest in a routine or mechanical procedure if conditions are continually 
supplied which demand that mode of operation and preclude any other sort…the mind, 
shut out from worthy employ and missing the taste of adequate performance, comes 
down to the level of that which is left to it to know and do, and perforce takes an interest 
in a cabined and cramped experience” (2010, 28). First and foremost, this is problematic 
because it seems to dehumanize the individual, considering people to be just as 
homogenous as the products that they produce.  But secondly, this point emphasizes how 
critical the peculiar human component is to the process of education and, through what 
we do with what we get out of that process, interpretation. 
  Dewey’s initial understanding of the rift between education and social life 
seemed to be that a society is only effective as its citizens; if that society fails to provide 
adequate education for the development of its individual citizens, the society as a whole 
cannot hope to develop. That is, the relationship that exists is one where “individuals are 
influenced, modified, changed, given shape by the myriad social transactions that 
comprise any given culture” (Downing 1995, 187). While the project of determining the 
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role of educative rhetoric starts with the individual (as Isocrates does), Dewey’s 
pragmatic rhetoric is needed to reveal the part that education has to play in greater 
society. This question of what kind of relationship formal education has to everyday life 
is certainly one that continues to arise for our society today. More often than not, the 
debate tends to focus on the question of whether education should begin and end with the 
school or whether learning necessarily continues (at least ideally) throughout one’s life. 
Dewey seems to agree with the latter. As he puts it, “[f]rom the standpoint of the child, 
the great waste in the school comes from his inability to utilize the experiences he gets 
outside the school in any complete and free way within the school itself; while, on the 
other hand, he is unable to apply in daily life what he is learning in school. That is the 
isolation of the school—its isolation from life” (Dewey 2010, 75). Thus the problem is 
with both the school and society, with advocates for one more often than not trying to 
downplay the importance of the other.  
From the perspective of pragmatic rhetoric, however, to separate the experience 
of learning in a formal setting from the experience of living out in the world is not only 
disadvantageous to the citizen, but to society as well. As Scott Stroud writes, “individuals 
and communities cannot be ontologically separated…The more important claim Dewey is 
making is that the development of the individual is the development of the community, 
and vice versa” (2011, 71). The greatest problem is trying to find a more effective means 
of understanding the functional relationship between the educative and the practical, as 
paralleled by the development of the individual and the development of society. 
According to Dewey, then, “We live in a world where all sides are bound together. All 
studies grow out of relations in the one great common world. When the child lives in 
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varied but concrete and active relationship to this common world, his studies are naturally 
unified…Relate the school to life, and all studies are of necessity correlated” (2010, 91). 
The first step in reconstructing the relationship between school and society is to realize 
that “The great masses of people do not live in isolation from one another. They form 
groups and share interests. They belong to communities, societies, and cultures” 
(Johnston 2006, 128). But as long as the school does not provide the right kind of 
learning environment, where individuals learn to communicate and interact with their 
fellow students, the opportunity for each to grow is severely limited. 
EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS FOR FOSTERING COMMUNICATION AND GROWTH 
It becomes necessary to specifically address what can go wrong with education as 
an institution, not simply with the goal of exposing what so clearly does not work, but 
also with the hope that such an investigation might yield solutions to remaking the 
educational environment to better relate to and individual’s “real world” social 
environment.  First off, in the traditional school system, “Learning here means 
acquisition of what already is incorporated in books and in the heads of the elders…It is 
taught as a finished product, with little regard either to the ways in which it was 
originally built up or to changes that will surely occur in the future” (Dewey 2007, 3).  
This type of static education is problematic because, in failing to adapt with changing 
experiences (not to mention changing times), it prohibits growth. Expanded to its wider 
application in everyday life, a static education can essentially produce static citizens, 
which in turn hinders the growth of a community.  
 43 
In this way, the individual can be smothered by institutional education’s over-
mechanized processes, such as performing rote memorization or sifting through the sheer 
mass of information that much formal education is required to teach, to the point where 
students learn disassociated pieces of info, not the process for linking that seemingly 
disparate information together. This stifles not only personal growth but also any hope for 
growth that the individual may experience in the future with others. A potential solution, 
according to John Kosnoski, is that “Dewey claims conversation can motivate 
participation in the face of such uncertainty and frustration…[and] individuals will 
undergo greater moral transformation and political growth as they increasingly interpret 
their seemingly private problems in terms of their public origins and consequences” 
(2005, 655). Thus, a reassessment of the aims of education is necessary, with respect to 
the personal predispositions and particular interests already at work defining the student 
in his or her own mind. The alternative is for students to continue being schooled in a 
general knowledge of how the world and the goings-on within it supposedly work, with 
little to no understanding of how to elaborate on their own personal perspectives.   
In this way, education should reinforce the means necessary for one’s continued 
growth, in both formal and informal learning environments; but as mentioned earlier, 
growth is often seen as a process with a set beginning and end. Where formal education 
seems to fall short is in both how and what it conditions its students for. Put another way, 
the kind of environment in which students are educated can clearly have a great impact 
on how they learn from future environments as future citizens. Johnston explains that, 
from this point of view, “Environment is recognized as playing a much larger role in 
cognition. Environments that were once considered of little consequence can now be 
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shown to have a demonstrative effect upon the interacting individual. Certain 
environments, for Dewey, lead to further and more satisfying experiences. Important for 
Dewey is face-to-face contact and communication: the basic tasks of the public” (2006, 
128).  Thus, teaching students to talk about how they relate to what may seem like their 
own worlds is a crucial step in teaching them to communicate with others about their 
worlds. Growth implies that as we encounter these differing perspectives, our own first-
person perspective evolves. That is, we need to realize that,  
Growth is akin to a natural end for the (human) organism…An individual is said 
to grow when she undergoes further and further satisfying experiences. What 
counts as a satisfying experience is none other than the having and augmentation 
of generic traits. Prior meanings, built up through prior inquiries, lend themselves 
to the richness and quality of these traits. Not only do many, if not most, of our 
experiences occur in the presence of others, but our experiences are often shared 
or informed by others. All of us to some extent have similar doings, sufferings, 
and undergoings. The realization that this is the case is the beginning of the 
possibility for control and ordering of experiences through the (public) use of 
inquiry. As experiences are shared and are amenable to transformation and 
heightening through inquiry, experiences can be enriched. (Johnston 2006, 138) 
While the next section will explore in depth what exactly this inquiry is all about, the take 
away for now is this: as human beings, we all have experiences and, though they are 
different, learning to communicate these experiences has the shared general outcome of 
affecting each other and helping one another to grow. In this way, “To grow is equally to 
participate in a community where one shares one’s experiences with others and has 
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experiences of others shared, in turn. The means for this sharing is education. To educate 
is a social activity: it does not and cannot take place outside of the context of other 
inquirers and communicators” (Johnston 2006, 139).  
The result of acknowledging this active place that we hold in the world allows us 
to “own” our unique perspectives and realize the interactions between ourselves and 
others in the world more fully based on our individual circumstances. Ultimately, the 
experiential-encounter becomes a kind of ever-changing means of communication 
evolving with changes in one’s environment. Dewey explains that it then becomes “[a] 
primary responsibility of educators…[to] not only be aware of the general principle of the 
shaping of actual experience by environing conditions, but that they also recognize in the 
concrete what surroundings are conducive to having experiences that lead to growth. 
Above all, they should know how to utilize the surroundings, physical and social, that 
exist so as to extract from them all that they have to contribute to building up experiences 
that are worthwhile” (2007, 25). The danger here is of decontextualizing ourselves, of 
perhaps falling back into the belief that there is a “right” way of being or learning as 
dictated by society, or into the belief that, per a negative and misconstrued reading of 
pragmatism, it is all relative and random—a kind of being that immobilizes the individual 
citizen as a passive entity. By trying to see the world through our own eyes, a concept 
that seems simple enough, we may not only be able to better understand our own lives, 
but realize the impact that our own living has on the lives of others as well.  
This strategy translates directly into how teachers ought to think about their jobs 
as educators. That is, “The teacher’s problem is thus twofold. On the one side, he 
needs…to be a student of individual traits and habits; on the other side, he needs to be a 
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student of the conditions that modify for better or worse the directions in which 
individual powers habitually express themselves” (Dewey 2005, 37). Making the most of 
our own experiences, then, encourages our own growth and, through communication, our 
ability to help others grow. This only happens when we realize that our experiences do 
not simply conform to one abstract or objective definition of what an experience should 
be, but rather must be examined individually on the basis of the context in which we (and 
they) are. That is, “[w]hen we say that a person is educated, we do not mean to imply that 
he has ceased to grow, but rather that he has been educated to the stage at which he can 
and will take the initiative in the further development of his capacities and interests” 
(Dewey 1973, 198). It ought to be the aim of education to supply students with the best 
environment possible in which to grow their minds, while simultaneously preparing them 
to both affect and be affected by the culture of which they are a part; if students are not 
provided with a nourishing environment in the relatively controlled context of the 
classroom, how well can they really be expected to adapt to the “real world” environment 
that comes later? After all, as Dewey would point out, though the environment may 
change, both formal education and learning throughout our lives are both part of our 
experience. As social actors, we have the ability to shape our society, but the quality of 
that environing society conditions how well we are able to change it. 
HABITS NEEDED FOR REFLECTIVE INQUIRY 
So far I have shown how communicating, as a unified act of experiences, 
empowers every individual citizen with a sense of agency. That is, while the act of 
communication may hold some particular value on its own, that value (and the 
 47 
communicative act’s potentialities for meaning) is only truly realized when the process of 
interpretation and understanding with and by others begins.  The next logical thing to 
explore is how this process of understanding takes place. The question is what kinds of 
actions should be secured by the student during his or her growth that will benefit him or 
her most in continuing that growth in the future. Put another way, the skills we develop 
should provide us with “the sort of orientation that we ought to adopt to be best ready for 
growth in our lived experience—one that, like the child, is raptly absorbed in the details 
of the present, but that, like the driven adult, attends to objects with foresight and 
connection to the projects and desires we wish to consummate in and through 
experience” (Stroud 2011, 158). It seems necessary to reconsider those everyday events 
which we often dismiss as commonplace as, instead, taking on a life of their own, not 
only as they are commonly experienced, but through the unique meanings with which we 
infuse and take away from them. 
Dewey refers to these particular skills as habits, and they inform how individuals 
learn to interact with and make sense of their world. He explains that these habits are “a 
form of executive skill, of efficiency in doing. A habit means an ability to use natural 
conditions as means to ends. It is an active control of the environment through control of 
the organs of action” (Dewey 2006, 37). Eventually, enough of these habitual patterns 
persist that they become customs or laws, common ways of thinking or acting that form 
the foundational connections of a society.  Initially, this may seem to suggest that habits 
become ruts or beaten paths to which societies become accustomed. These kinds of “bad 
habits” manifest themselves as barriers to progress or change in the form of the closed 
mind. Dewey explains that “[p]eople have closed minds for one of three reasons—or 
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some combination of them. The first of these is prejudice…The second is pride…The 
third is selfishness…[But] open-mindedness is the antithesis of prejudice, pride, and 
selfishness; it means accepting all truth even when this means that one’s own ideas and 
preconceptions must be altered or abandoned, or even when this requires that one forego 
some personal advantage” (1973, 289). Although the word “habit” tends to bring to mind 
this kind of routinized, negative activity, the skills that pragmatic rhetoric encourages 
schools to develop in their students are “good habits,” habits as they ought to be, always 
open to change. 
 When used toward reflective inquiry, we use these good habits to make our 
decision about the best possible way to act, interpret, or understand a given instance of 
communication. In a way, the individual’s habits come to represent him or herself and 
vice versa; according to Pappas, “Character is a working interaction of habits. We cannot 
always come to an accurate assessment of the character of a person from assessing his or 
her conduct even after a long period of time. However, this is not because character is 
something "inner" that may or may not externally cause action, but simply because there 
is no certainty about when our actions are expressions of stable dispositions (habits) and 
when they are accidental reactions to an undetermined number of contextual factors” 
(1997b, 449-450). Ideally, then, education should cultivate a certain repertoire of habits 
in the individual, which he or she can then depend upon and use as tools for negotiating 
or navigating a given social interaction or communication.  When this is not the case, 
education “inhibits the development of open-mindedness, and nourishes habits of 
prejudice and dogmatism. One of most common examples of this bad teaching is its 
requirement of conformity and uniformity, its insistence that all students must comply in 
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the same way with fixed regulations and all must complete the same assignments. This 
procedure conduces habits of dogmatism, since students are taught to regard the teacher 
as the final authority and to parrot his opinions, both in recitation and on examination” 
(Dewey 1973, 289).  In a sense, then, habits parallel the idea of kairos introduced in 
chapter one as an ability to act appropriately in a given situation given a particular set of 
available resources. That is, we come to an experiential-encounter with certain possible 
ways of acting and reacting to it that we have acquired from previous experiences. While 
the resources that an individual has available to incorporate may come from some 
external locus such as the kind of environment he or she is in at a given time, habits are 
the internal resources that an individual brings with him or herself to any experience. It is 
through these tools, through the habits we employ in the act of reflective communication 
and inquiry, that our perspective can be either broadened or narrowed. This concept of 
perspective, what we come to develop from our own pasts and individual experiences, is 
what I believe is the driving force behind what we each get out of our communicative 
exchanges in particular. 
These habits are not always conscious, nor do they necessarily need to be. 
Although we each essentially pull from our own pool of past experiences, our awareness 
of drawing on certain habits may impact our present experience in less direct or less 
obvious ways. Dewey explains that, “There is thus a double movement in all reflection: a 
movement from the given partial and confused data to a suggested comprehensive (or 
inclusive) entire situation; and back from this suggested whole—which as suggested is a 
meaning, an idea—to the particular facts, so as to connect these with one another and 
with additional facts to which the suggestion has directed attention” (2005, 64). Simply 
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put, because no particular meaning is emphasized for the individual , that individual pulls 
from his or her pool of past experiences for making meaning while simultaneously 
pulling from his or her own potentialities. In this way, the habits taught in education, the 
very connections one formally learns to make better sense of one’s world, both in and 
outside the classroom, should ideally continue to serve as the basis for the constant 
development of stronger but more flexible habits throughout one’s life. 
Whether conscious or not, Dewey explains that the kind of good habits we 
develop should work toward what he calls reflective inquiry: “Reflection involves not 
simply a sequence of ideas, but a consequence—a consecutive ordering in such a way 
that each determines the next as its proper outcome, while each in turn leans back on its 
predecessors;[must] aim at knowledge, at belief about facts or in truths; [the] acceptance 
or rejection of something as reasonably probable or improbable; The consequences of a 
belief upon other beliefs and upon behavior may be so important, then, that men are 
forced to consider the grounds or reasons of their belief and its logical consequences” 
(2005, 3-6). Reflective inquiry in education ought to teach individuals how to not only 
embody what they learn so that they are constantly reflecting on and restructuring their 
knowledge, but also reveal to those individuals how that reflection works to reshape their 
ways of making meaning from their experience. What reflective inquiry offers is “the 
experienced uniqueness of each situation and the reality of change and novelty involved 
in it. What an experiential approach requires would be different if situations shared more 
than functional similarity. But in our moral life it is always a specific ‘felt’ trouble, 
question, confusion that sets moral inquiry going” (Pappas 1997a , 544).  
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Formal education should develop these particular skills of thinking or doing in 
students. While the three Rs of reading, writing, and arithmetic come to mind, these skills 
are not necessarily the most valuable ones that school can impart to the individual 
student. Rather, Dewey suggests that it is the business of education “to cultivate deep-
seated and effective habits of discriminating tested beliefs from mere assertions, guesses, 
and opinions; to develop a lively, sincere and open-minded preference for conclusions 
that are properly grounded, and to ingrain into the individual’s working habits methods of 
inquiry and reasoning appropriate to the various problems that present themselves” 
(2005, 23). These skills certainly may serve the individual in formal education, but have 
at least as much, if not more, value for the rest of his or her life. In particular, these habits 
can be used to make one’s everyday experiences more reflective, which Stroud defines as 
“not just [being] absorbed in the immediate qualities presented, but [also reflecting] on 
the meaning of those qualities as connected to other events, qualities, or states of affairs. 
The reflective activity gives one added meaning and allows one to order or instate values 
in one’s experience” (2011, 54). However, this is not to suggest that one’s experience 
should always be reflective; rather, reflective inquiry enables our ability to adapt when 
certain significant experiences arise, allowing us to have more meaningful reactions to 
and interactions with those experiences.   Habits like these lay the groundwork for how 
the individual as a citizen is able to make the most of associated living. The idea of the 
reflecting citizen entails an individual who is continually defining and being defined by 
the experiences that he or she is living out. It is through learning to communicate this 
experience, through reflective inquiry, that the reshaping of self and experience takes on 
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a very real quality in the world. .  Thus, the act of communication is seen as a place of 
work where reflecting subjects learn to connect through their experiential-encounters.  
THE SCHOOL, SOCIETY, AND MELIORISM 
 
 Pragmatic rhetoric helps resolve the isolation of school from society with respect 
to the ends and means we ascribe to the value and purpose of education not merely in the 
classroom, but in all our social interactions. We tend to see the school and society as 
fundamentally separate; the former a kind of intellectual penance that everyone must 
endure before becoming a full-fledged citizen entering into the latter “real world.” The 
problem here is that, at best, the individual develops only personal motivations, or ends, 
for acting in that world. The result is using one’s habits or even others as mere tools to 
achieve some temporary, fleeting desire. That is, formal schooling alone can create 
“[o]rientations that render communication as incomplete, fragmented, and less effective 
at building community are those orientations that tend to separate means/ends and 
process/product in communication and that tend to make the value of the means (in this 
case, interacting with others) depend solely on the value of the end that one desires” 
(Stroud 2008, 179). The main problem here is that the experiences that the individual 
encounters through various classes and other interactions in school are often seen as self-
contained, without any worthwhile bearing on the individual’s experience after he or she 
leaves formal schooling.  
The default end of learning seems to suggest students fulfilling some kind of 
curricular exercise, whether it is passing a test, writing a paper, or getting good grades. 
But as Dewey points out, “judging an educational experiment by the pupil’s ability to 
 53 
‘keep up’ with the system the experiment is trying to improve, is of very little value. The 
purpose…is rather to give the child an education which will make him a better, happier, 
more efficient human being, by showing him what his capabilities are and how he an 
exercise them, both materially and socially, in the world he finds about him” (1915, 58). 
While high marks on these various assignments may have positive ramifications within 
the school itself, they are hollow rewards that choke off the true value of the student’s 
learning: that is, to form a foundation from which he or she continues to build up and 
shape his or her encounters in various communicative interactions for the rest of his or 
her life. Or, as Biesta puts it, “In the case of education…we not only need to ask whether 
our educational activities, strategies, and — if one wishes to use the word — 
interventions are desirable in themselves; we also always need to ask what are the 
educational effects of our actions” (1997, 9). Along these lines, Dewey suggests the 
following about how to link school and society as ends and means to one another: 
 [T]he end of education is not just the cultivation of scholars or bookworms who 
are satisfied to spend all their time reading, but rather it is to cultivate useful 
members of society. Ability to read is not enough to make a good citizen, if by 
good citizen we mean one who must make [a] real contribution to his 
society…First, the school must make students want to fulfill their duties to 
society…Second, the school must acquaint students with the nature of social 
life…And third, the school should not merely acquaint students with the needs of 
society, but must also prepare them to meet these needs. (1973, 211)  
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But what kind of responsibility is implied here in the relationship between the individual 
and society? Fortunately, an answer lies in how we approach our habits as means to ends 
that go beyond our personal satisfaction. 
 Reflective inquiry helps individuals to see that they are part of a bigger picture by 
linking experiences in the present with more removed experiences in the past or future. 
What’s more, those individuals begin to understand that the other pieces that make up 
that bigger picture are a part of who they are. But for pragmatic rhetoric, simply realizing 
these interconnections is not enough; something must be done with that knowledge. 
While habits of inquiry can certainly useful to the individual as ends in their own right, 
we need to ask if these habits might be even more useful as means to some ends for 
greater society. Pappas offers a suggestion here, writing that, “For Dewey acts are not 
contextless events or mere external effects of a self. In fact for Dewey moral conduct is 
an expression of the moral self” (1997b, 461). The next step is to ask, if our habits are 
indeed moral expressions of self: Is there some way that the expression of the habits of all 
citizens is found in the moral expression of a society? Pappas explains further that, for 
Dewey, “there are at least three reasons why moral conduct is an expression of the moral 
self: (1) because moral conduct is an expression of intention, (2) because moral conduct 
reveals acquired character, and (3) because in some fundamental ontological sense what 
‘I do’ is what ‘I am’” (1997b, 464). One’s habits, then, become how one sees, and is seen 
by, the society of which one is a part. This is not to say that a moral focus inherently or 
instantaneously makes a society “good” or “bad”; the key here is to suggest that, through 
their habits of reflective inquiry, individuals not only have the ability to better 
themselves, but also to better their society. This perspective is known as meliorism, and 
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can be defined as the bettering “of one’s experience by intelligently adjusting one’s deep-
seated orientations toward self, others, and the value of an activity” (Stroud 2011, 9). 
 In order to really learn the most we can from our communication with others, it is 
necessary to understand not only how we are affected by or how we affect certain habits, 
but also what the consequences of these habits can mean for affecting change in society. 
This is one place in particular where Dewey fills in an important gap left by Isocrates: 
while Isocrates focused on natural, personal ability in the individual, Dewey takes that 
notion a step further by suggesting that personal and social ability are integrally linked. 
As we become more aware of our various personal habits, both conscious and 
unconscious, those habits become plastic. If habits are the resources developed by formal 
education that we can deploy in a given instance of communication, it becomes apparent 
that these habits contribute to a greater understanding of how exactly that communication 
can be drawn upon in order to enact melioristic change within a community. Ideally, our 
interactions in society reflect “a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated 
experience. The extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in an 
interest so that each has to refer his own action to that of others, and to consider the 
action of others to give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking down 
of those barriers of class, race, and national territory which kept men from perceiving the 
full import of their activity” (Dewey 2006, 69). The reason for pursuing educational 
experiences beyond the school is that the individual will both be able to learn from and 
contribute to ways of meliorating this associated living. Put another way, although 
students will continue to have experiential-encounters regardless of the intervention of 
formal education, it makes sense to use the time spent in school to establish enduring 
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good habits. After all, the students will ideally continue to refine these habits on their 
own within the framework that the school has established. 
Both the Deweyean and Isocratean approaches to education shy away from 
learning as mere individual acquisition of information, focusing instead on how that 
learning translates into skills or abilities which the individual can continue to use and 
consequently improve upon throughout his or her life. The rhetorical significance is that 
the notion of improvement connotes a sense of bettering oneself, which I argue is an 
essential point to bridging the gap between personal and societal experience by 
approaching learning through a moral lens. Not only does analyzing education through 
the lens of morality provide the individual with a sense of self amidst a greater 
community of individuals, it also provides a reason for that society to encourage its 
individuals to better themselves; to put it simply, what is good for one is good for the 
other. Along those lines, Dewey writes that 
Moral education has deep and pervasive implications, especially when we look at 
it from the point of view of the philosophical problem of the relationship of the 
individual and society. The difference between education that is moral and that 
which is not lies in the fact that in the former the knowledge, the ability, and the 
emotion of the individual are emphasized at the same time that they are directed 
to the development of social sympathy. Thus the main problem of moral 
education is to develop individuality in such ways as will enhance the individual’s 
social sympathy, as will dispose him to subordinate his own advantage to the 
interests of social welfare, and as will develop a feeling of identification with and 
loyalty to the society of which he is a member. (1973, 298) 
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Understood with this moral focus in mind, the purpose of education shifts; rather than 
learning isolated topics, the individual’s education starts with relationships. Education 
then becomes a matter of how to best understand (and later on, engage with) social life. 
The kind of “social sympathy” to which Dewey refers reveals why pursuing learning 
beyond the four walls of the classroom is worthwhile, as well as providing an entry point 
into making sense of how that learning is rhetorical. Put another way, social sympathy 
can be understood as a kind of world-building activity that takes place between the 
individual self and society. As Biesta puts it, “when individuals act together in order to 
achieve a common goal, they need to adjust their individual approaches, their individual 
perspectives and patterns of action in such a way that a coordinated response becomes 
possible.  In this process their individual worlds are transformed.  These worlds do not 
become identical, but what does happen, Dewey argued, is that the partners in interaction 
create a shared, intersubjective, world.  They make, in other words, ‘something in 
common’—and it is for precisely this reason that Dewey referred to this process as 
communication” (1994, 12).  
 The goal then becomes one of working toward the best kind of communication 
practices possible, both for ourselves and for our common society. Stroud notes that, 
“Meliorism helps here as well by suggesting how we ought to communicate, how 
meaning-making goes wrong in particular circumstances, and ways to change communal 
situations of discourse” (2010, 51). Thus, the aim of education must be “to create good 
citizens. A more detailed way of saying the same thing is to say that education must 
enable every individual both to benefit from the past and present culture of his society, 
and to contribute to the development of the emerging culture by initiating new 
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experiences of his own which may influence others to participate in new kinds of social 
action” (Dewey 1973, 210). It is not enough for students to learn solely about abstract 
experience from the past, but instead to learn to connect that knowledge to their personal 
experience in the present. The critical point that emerges here is “the conception that 
education is a constant reorganizing or reconstructing of experience. It has all the time an 
immediate end, and so far as activity is educative, it reaches that end—the direct 
transformation of the quality of experience” (Dewey 2006, 61).  Education no longer 
becomes about what to know for one’s personal advantage, but rather always modifying 
what one can do through how one knows and employs that knowledge in one’s 
interactions with others. Ultimately, the community is imbued with life from the myriad 
experiences of all those individuals who make it up, implicating those citizens in the 
creation and interpretation of society. Communication becomes a tool for not only 
consuming the world, but also a means of producing totally new ways of perceiving and 
(re)creating that world. When communication is used in such a way as to achieve 
something new in social experience, it breaks free of its culturally assigned role of merely 
transmitting information; it becomes a means of not just reproduction but of creation. 
CONCLUSION 
 Pragmatic rhetoric serves to establish the second phase of this two-part program 
for bringing about change in education. It demonstrates the value of the experiences 
developed in formal schooling to the experiences had by an individual after he or she 
finds him or herself as part of a greater society. As Dewey puts it, “[t]o ‘learn from 
experience’ is to make a backward and forward connection between what we do to things 
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and what we enjoy or suffer from things in consequence. Under such conditions, doing 
becomes a trying; an experiment with the world to find out what it is like; the undergoing 
becomes instruction—discovery of the connection of things” (2006, 112). It is this 
continued experimentation and discovery that education needs to strive for. While 
Isocrates and Dewey demonstrate why change in education benefits both formal 
schooling and society at large, it is now necessary to explore what that innovation could 
look like. To this end, in the following chapter I introduce the idea of “inhabited 
learning” as a kind of educational experience that encourages individuals to reflect on the 
knowledge they acquire both from the classroom and their everyday lived experience, 













Chapter 3: Realizing Inhabited Learning through Rhetorical Invention 
 
 We now come to the final chapter of this project: what, in fact, we can expect 
from the individual (and what he or she can expect from him or herself) who continues to 
master educative and pragmatic rhetoric. I previously mentioned that these concepts are 
two sides of the same coin; now, it is time to determine what exactly that coin is worth. 
Isocrates and Dewey essentially represent two ends of the same spectrum with a gap in 
between them. This chapter attempts to fill in that gap. If one follows the path laid out in 
the two previous chapters, a common theme should emerge: as human beings, our best 
and most original thinking happens in concert with others. While this is not to say that 
forced collaboration should automatically be preferred to isolation, what is being said 
here is that the opportunities for enacting what we know in creative ways flourish when 
our ideas bump up against others through communication. The outcome of such an 
intermixing of knowledge and activity is typically referred to as innovation or invention; 
the former tends to connote a rehashing or restructuring of some previously known ideas, 
while the latter tends to connote bringing new ideas into existence. However, although 
this distinction can be made, I will use the terms of innovation and invention 
interchangeably, since the “products” of both can be equally valuable. In addition, 
rhetorical invention is considered one of the five major canons of rhetoric as a discipline, 
and primarily concerns itself with the creation and use of meanings and argument. 
Rhetorical invention thus requires a degree of kairos, a common theme for both Isocrates 
and Dewey, which can have a profound effect on one’s ability to invent.  
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This final chapter will be divided into three main sections. The first section 
explores the conditions necessary for invention. The second section addresses attempts to 
define the nature of invention itself. The third and final section is concerned with 
defining the concept of inhabited learning. Along the way, the lines between the 
knowledge we acquire (theory) and what we do with that knowledge (practice) will 
continue to blur. When one reaches the point where these concepts are understood as 
mutually dependent and uses that reflection to inform how and what changes one “thinks 
up,” inhabited learning has been achieved. Inhabited learning is concerned with formal 
education for lifelong learning and explores why, even with Dewey’s and Isocrates’ 
thought in mind, our learning experiences still do not seem to be happening as they ought 
to be. And so, I propose that inhabited learning bridges the work of these two thinkers in 
a way that gets at what might have been left out of the equation for better education. 
From a rhetorical point of view, this includes practices such as teaching students to 
understand the power of persuasive language, rather than using persuasion or coercion to 
somehow force students “to learn.” The former practice empowers students with the 
strength needed for innovative thinking by making people aware of the learning 
environment that they inhabit. Inhabited learning serves as my umbrella term for all of 
the processes and interactions discussed thus far, and it will be the primary focus of the 
third and final section of this chapter. First, however, it is necessary to explore the very 
conditions required to make invention possible. 
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CONDITIONS FOR INVENTION 
 Like the individual, rhetorical invention requires a particular kind of environment 
in order to flourish. This point can also be related back to the academy, with regard to 
whether or not the atmosphere that the school provides is amenable to both helping 
individuals grow and think “outside the box.” Unfortunately, in school and in life, 
possible ideas tend to get boiled down to two or three polarizing points of view. This is 
the closed-mindedness to which Dewey refers in the previous chapter. A great deal of 
effort needs to be put into trying to understand the conditions that need to be in place in 
order to reconcile these polarizing viewpoints in a way that can retain the best of both 
worlds. To the end of mitigating these often polarizing conflicts, Karen Burke LeFevre 
takes the following approach: if everything boils down to these opposing points of view, 
what is typically referred to as dialectic, we should concern ourselves with whether or not 
a middle road can be found between them. These polarizing persepctives most often 
present themselves in everyday social situations that require an agile, reflective mind to 
negotiate and meliorate them. 
 LeFevre starts with the basic premise that correlates the value of reaching a 
common understanding or meaning with the context in which that meaning is derived. To 
put it simply, what makes the best meaning is its usefulness to a given situation. As 
Dewey showed, meaning making comes about through our communication with others, 
and LeFevre seems to agree. She writes that “[o]ne invents in part because of others, 
because one thinks fruitfully in the company of a great many others, who are both 
possible and real” (1987, 93). We need this kind of collaboration to begin to get our own 
ideas off the ground. Along with a general disposition for satisfying our curiosity, we as 
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human beings can also be notoriously closed-minded (as mentioned above). LeFevre’s 
answer is that another goal of collaboration is shaking us out of how enamored we are 
with our own genius. That is, talking with others “helps to show a perspective of 
invention that takes the invention process out of the mind of the individual and into the 
interaction of real people” (LeFevre 1987, 62). This way, good ideas are pushed out into 
the light for all to consider; decent ideas can only be made better by that same process. 
 For LeFevre, then, what makes invention rhetorical is that it is a social act. As she 
puts it, “Invention is active in the sense that according to contemporary definitions, 
invention is increasingly regarded as the act of creating something, not only as the act of 
retrieving and rendering what was previously known. And invention is social in that even 
while it occurs in an individual, it is heavily influenced by that individual’s relationship 
to others through the social entity of language as well as through social structures, forms, 
purposes, and practices” (1987, 119-120). While this is certainly reminiscent of the role 
that reflective inquiry can play in communication, insofar as better ideas are encouraged 
in individuals who are aware of the influence of where those ideas originated, rhetorical 
invention also retains a melioristic quality. While having bigger or brighter ideas is 
certainly a valuable end in itself, LeFevre explains that this kind of collaboration “is also 
a way of insuring that people are involved in the process of inventing so that they have a 
stake in the outcome” (1987, 75). Thus, the new social bonds forged through rhetorical 
invention become just as important as the new ideas that might be generated. 
 Roy Wagner takes a similar “social” approach to rhetorical invention. For 
Wagner, there is something fundamentally human about the process of invention and how 
it is linked to the cultures that we create. Like the concept of associated living from 
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chapter two, Wagner suggests that our source of creative genius comes out of our contact 
with one another. The difference for Wagner is that he believes that we as human beings 
have become blind to our own creativity capacity. He writes that “[b]y assuming that we 
merely measure, predict, or harness this world of situations, individuals, and forces, we 
mask the fact that we create it” (1981, 71). This notion also echoes the rhetorical point 
made by Isocrates that, through language, we create our world. In our eagerness to 
determine the “fixed” values or truths that seemingly define our culture, then, we often 
overlook the ability of our own actions to shape that culture. 
 Wagner continues to echo LeFevre in explaining that one person’s good idea in 
fact does very little “good” if it remains isolated.  As he puts it, “It is elemental to a 
definition of man that he continually invests his ideas, seeking external equivalents that 
not only articulate them, but also subtly change them in the process, until often these 
meanings take on a life of their own, and possess their authors” (1981, 34). So, in one 
respect, rhetorical invention becomes a way of helping us realize how our ideas grow, or 
even what got them growing in the first place. But in another respect, rhetorical invention 
reveals something about our own personal growth as well. According to Wagner,  
“In our living with these toys, tools, articles, and heirlooms, desiring them, treasuring 
them, we admit into our personalities the whole range of values, attitudes, and 
sentiments—indeed the creativity of those who invented them, used them, know and 
desire them, or gave them to us. In learning to use tools we are secretly learning to use 
ourselves” (1981, 76-77). The environmental conditions that rhetorical invention requires 
in order to flourish, then, are very similar to those conditions needed for the individual to 
become a reflective citizen; in fact, the two seem to be inextricably linked. Assuming 
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those ideal environing conditions are met, it now becomes a matter of determining what 
actually takes place when individuals and cultures come together in the political forum, 
school, or coffee house conversation.  
THE NATURE OF INVENTION 
 While the kinds of conditions discussed above may work significantly toward 
triggering an instance of rhetorical invention, it is necessary to explore what really takes 
place in that “aha!” moment. To do so first requires realizing that there is not just one 
type or kind of invention; though earth-shattering discoveries tend to come to mind first 
and foremost, invention also includes the nuances and refinements of preexisting ideas. 
This was suggested above with the brief reference to dialectic: when two opposing forces 
come together, the product of the conflict is to discover a kind of middle-ground. John 
Muckelbauer takes this notion as his starting point. 
 Muckelbauer’s primary concern is this: if we are constantly trying to work our 
way out of various dialectics, are we actually achieving any real progress or change? 
Perhaps surprisingly, Muckelbauer suggests that, while the solution or change might be 
real, it can never fully remove itself from the original composition of the dialectic. He 
explains that there are three typical approaches used when faced with dialectic: 
(1) In this first style of engagement, one emphasizes a traditionally privileged concept 
and negates its traditionally underprivileged counterpart. (2008, 6) 
(2) The second response flips the dialectical coin and privileges the underdog.  
(2008, 7) 
 66 
(3) This third response recognizes the ethical and political dangers associated with 
taking either side in this interminable confrontation. Not wanting to become 
engaged in the movement of negation that engineers both positions, it attempts to 
overcome the oppositional movement itself by synthesizing these opposing poles 
(2008, 8) 
Even though the third option seems to be the “right answer” for many rhetoricians, it 
leaves Muckelbauer dissatisfied because it still remains within the original confines of the 
dialectic. His alternative is to examine the situation in which the dialectic develops with 
the hope that the context will furnish some kind of solution. That is, “If rhetoric is 
fundamentally an art of contingency and context and if things like truth and knowledge 
are dependent on actual situations and actual audiences, it becomes crucial to determine 
what a situation or an audience actually is, what its key components are and how it works 
in practice (Muckelbauer 2008, 24). This mirrors both Isocrates’ and Dewey’s emphasis 
that all understanding begins with a particular experience.  
 According to Muckelbauer, then, the outcome for how we redefine invention 
based on this model is essentially in terms of a shift on a spectrum: at one end lies what is 
akin to the rhetoric of probabilities, while the rhetoric of possibilities lie at the other end. 
The shift that occurs moves the nature and consequent function of rhetorical invention 
closer to that latter point, to the realm of what might be possible. Even though this shift 
doesn’t seem to get us out of the original problem with the dialectic, it may still be 
enough to shift our perspective and examine these dialectical repetitions through an 
inventive point of view. 
 67 
 Steven Johnson also starts from the dialectical point as the place where invention 
begins. However, like LeFevre, he is more concerned with the opposing forces within the 
dialectic, how they literally come together and oftentimes collide. Thus, although 
Johnson does not seem to see different ideas or perspectives as inherently interconnected 
through the dialectic, connection does result from very disparate ideas being forcefully 
thrown together. The take away is that we can often decide what ideas we want to throw 
together in the first place. This is akin to searching out ideai for Isocrates, where the 
individual’s learning is tantamount to uncovering which ideas or perspectives of seeing 
the world stick with him or her. Johnson writes that, “innovative environments are better 
at helping their inhabitants explore the adjacent possible, because they expose a wide and 
diverse sample of spare parts—mechanical or conceptual—and they encourage novel 
ways of recombining those parts (2010, 41). In a sense, then, while we’ve already 
discussed the kind of environments that make invention possible, Johnson seems to imply 
that the moment of invention itself supplies a kind of environment. 
 So what exactly is the point of all this? Why does rhetorical invention matter? 
Well, if what Johnson describes is a useful way of thinking about invention (and I believe 
it is), it suggests that when the conditions are right, the creative learning process 
resonates throughout every fiber of society, from the community down through the 
individual down to his or her very being, which predisposes him or her to think in 
particular ways. While this kind of creative learning can certainly happen to varying 
degrees, what is essential here is that the conditions are in place so that creative learning 
has a better chance of taking place. Put another way, Dewey might suggest that although 
we need not be in a constant state of reflective inquiry, what is required is that we find or 
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create an environment that allows inquiry to be effective when we do need it. The real 
trick, however, is looping this process, where what the individual comes up with is seen 
as valuable to the degree that, ideally, it works itself back up the chain of social 
interaction. The particular take away that Johnson seems to have for us is this: “The story 
here is not the old chestnut of living in a connected age where information flows more 
quickly than ever before. The information is not simply flowing in this system; it’s being 
recycled and put to new uses, transformed by a diverse network of other species in the 
ecosystem, each with its own distinct function” (2010, 208). Realizing that all of our 
experiences as human beings are somehow linked, to the degree that putting our heads 
together makes us more effective problem solvers, innovators and community builders, 
seems to be what Isocrates, Dewey, and rhetorical invention are all about. And this 
realization is what I refer to as inhabited learning. 
INHABITED LEARNING AND HUMAN EXPERIENCE 
For this project, I have shown that learning should be understood as a “good,” 
defined here as something desirable that has beneficial effects for individuals and 
societies alike. What is more, I have also shown that through such an understanding, the 
learned skills of the individual can be put to good use in bettering his or her society. But 
to define learning in such a way begs the following question: Despite the great emphasis 
that many societies put on the value of learning, why do our educational institutions often 
fail to live up to their responsibility?  Granted, this is not to say that learning should be 
the same for everyone, since not everyone learns in “the” same way.  What matters, 
though, is how people can find the opportunities to become better learners and 
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consequently better citizens.  At the very least, inhabited learning can help people make 
better qualitative connections with the information with which they are presented and 
with which they identify in their everyday lives; at most, inhabited learning is about 
instilling and cultivating a natural drive to learn in individuals that far exceeds any 
expectation of confining learning to the period of formal education in one’s life; in fact, I 
believe that inhabited learning can enhance the formal learning experience as well. 
 This project has come a long way in redefining rhetoric and education as having a 
practically-oriented purpose. Through its emphasis on individual ability, 
interdisciplinarity of thought, and the merging of a creatively adaptive pedagogy with 
everyday experience, inhabited learning seems to establish a new way of approaching the 
relationship between rhetoric and education. This type of education highly values the 
influence and impact of what one learns in school to one’s everyday life and vice versa, 
with one naturally informing the other. Inhabited learning can be contrasted with learning 
that is inhibited, or education as it more often than not tends to be practiced today. 
Disciplinary isolation, one-sidedness in academic argument, and inability or 
unwillingness to connect what goes on in the classroom with the rest of the world outside 
can all contribute to inhibiting the educational experience of both the student and the 
teacher. If Isocrates and Dewey are correct in suggesting that we are, in fact, judged 
based on the habits that each of us chooses to enact in our everyday lives, it becomes 
imperative that we learn the best habits possible. And those habits must be encouraged 
through education.  
 Inhabited learning can thus be said to have three main goals. The first two goals 
concern the role and significance of the individual and the community, respectively, 
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while the third goal addresses the double identity that an individual may develop as both 
a particular “self” and as a citizen. Inhabited learning thus involves an education through 
which what is learned becomes a part of the individual and a part of how they interact 
with others. Within the academy more particularly, the individual scholar’s advantage of 
knowledge needs to be translated to the advantage of all, still including him or herself but 
also shared with his or her students, colleagues inside or outside the department, and the 
greater academic community. Essentially, inhabited learning posits that what is good for 
the one needs to be as good as it can be for as many others as possible. From another 
academic perspective, the goal of education itself is to demonstrate these best practices 
for thinking and acting to the student, mirroring Isocrates’ own emphasis on declamation; 
in this way, teachers become another potential source of inspiration for the student to 
draw upon. And so, even the more individualized aspects of inhabited learning concern 
themsevles with channeling multiple personalities and perspectives. 
 The second goal of inhabited learning deals more explicitly with how one 
interacts with others. Specifically, this side of inhabited learning reflects the critical 
importance of communication to the success of education. In this instance, effective 
communication is defined as one’s ability to meet others on their terms. As Schiappa puts 
it, “[i]f…my goal is empathy—that is, if I try to understand who that person is from the 
‘inside out’—then not only will I treat her more ethically, as a full human being and not 
just by mere difference, I will also learn and grow as a person myself” (1995, 40). In this 
way, the significance of the communicative act lies not in how well one argues one’s 
point or whether or not one speaks persuasively, but in one’s ability to maintain a 
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receptive mind to open discourse. From a communication perspective, inhabited learning 
is about becoming a more effective participant and discussant. 
 The third goal deals with the double identity that seems to be needed in order to 
actually carry Isocrates’ teachings into Dewey’s pragmatic practice. The student of 
rhetoric must learn to maintain an identity as both an individual self and as a citizen, 
which, while he or she may sometimes come under scrutiny for leaning too much one 
way or the other, is an overall positive endeavor. Instead of connoting some kind of 
schizophrenia in the mind of the individual that cannot be reconciled between the public 
and private spheres of life, the double or perhaps multiple identities advocated by 
inhabited learning are needed to do just that: bridge the gap between education’s ivory 
tower and the greater public forum. This identity is specifically inspired by and 
constructed from the various perspectives that one has encountered and learned from; 
one’s training teaches one when certain identities are more appropriate, emphasizing 
kairos as another critical component of inhabited learning. 
 This double identity also has ramifications for teaching as a profession. Since the 
goal of learning is to encourage the intellect and morals of students, education itself must 
be tied to a sense of moral duty. That is not to say that education should take on the moral 
onus of a religion or, perhaps today, a political party, but rather that education across the 
board often sells itself short; without taking on this extra responsibility, it cannot hope to 
reap the rewards of producing well-informed citizens who can think for themselves. 
Robert Hariman writes that this kind of education “becomes a profession in the ethical 
sense of that term, in order that it can model the appropriate character for all public 
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practices. This character is developed in part by learning how to speak in the many 
distinctive voices that make up the city as a whole, past and present” (2004, 230).  
So what exactly is inhabited learning all about? Inhabited learning is 
fundamentally about the story told from one’s life experiences, formed by what can now 
be understood as the incredibly complex interweaving of connections and associations 
found in one’s everyday life. In an age where we have seemingly unlimited information 
brought to us almost instantaneously, it no longer suffices for education to serve 
individuals as but another isolated source of information. Rather, a rhetorical education 
should be a source of confluence for individuals, with an eye to the socially demarcated 
“time in school” as an opportunity to catalyze an individual’s learning experience. 
Rhetorical education can accomplish this goal by helping that individual learn the 
theories and practices that will enable him or her to become a more effective citizen; 
perhaps it may even be the first step toward a more socially aware and critically 
conscious society. But it all starts with a way of teaching individuals, as lifelong students 
of a shared human experience, how to immerse themselves in what they learn so that 
stronger attractions are made with the ideas, opinions, and arguments which they 
encounter in their everyday lives and which come to define the type of citizen that 
student will become. 
CONCLUSION 
Education has always been touted as a kind of investment in students as the future 
of society. Yet today, that investment has been corrupted by the demands of literal 
investments in education through the manipulation of the goals and perspectives of higher 
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learning by outside interests. The great irony is that those interests that can afford to help 
improve education are bending their resources toward turning learning on its head. 
Education has always provided a kind of safe haven for investigating and sharing new 
ideas, and it is my belief that it serves society best in that capacity. Thus, it has been the 
goal of this thesis to present a reasonable case for not just maintaining formal education 
as a vital social institution, but also to elaborate on the ways that education can become a 
more fulfilling social experience.  
 It is the responsibility of rhetoric to make this experience a reality. If providing 
the best possible conditions for education still may not encourage individuals to pursue 
learning on their own, what can be done? If the purpose of education is to make people 
more involved with their own, personal learning, then education needs to be concerned 
with how students are learning rather than what they are being taught. Put another way, 
education need not focus on content so much as the skills for reflective inquiry that can 
make any learning experience so much more valuable. This means teaching students how 
to think about, talk about, and engage with the content that now lies literally at their 
fingertips. After all, a great deal of the information that teachers used to bring to students 
is now available in their habitable world, so education needs to teach those students how 
to manipulate that information in order to make sense of it for themselves. The alternative 
is for individuals to have their minds made up for them by the veiled interests or 
perspectives that may push that information on them. 
 Applied in this way, rhetoric can set us on the right track toward a better method 
of enabling people to become lifelong learners. The first, crucial step lies with formal 
education and making individuals want to step into that learning environment. In taking 
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that first step, in beginning with those students, the benefits of an education structured 
through inhabited learning can radiate from the individual to the rest of society. But it all 
starts with one person. So often we spend our time struggling alone trying to find answers 
to questions that were asked years and years ago; other times we get so focused on 
answering our contemporaries’ questions that we forget to ask our own. The consequence 
is that we get caught in a vicious circle without making any real progress in finding a 
solution to the very questions that we chased down the rabbit hole in the first place. 
Adopting a rhetorical perspective allows us to look at what has come before us in order to 
engage the past with the hope of finding, at the very least, some foundation from which 
we can begin to redefine our present. 
Inhabited learning thus provides a means for us to rethink how we organize and 
value education, both within academia and without. Interestingly enough, one may 
suggest that the future of learning lies in constantly renegotiating the meaning and 
subsequent purpose of learning in the past for the sake of the present. This thesis shows 
that even great thinkers removed from us in time and space are still great; they can still 
cast light on modern topics in new and unfamiliar ways, encouraging different and even 
multiple perspectives. Inhabited learning, then, demonstrates how, while the form of 
education may be and perhaps needs to be ever-changing to meet new concerns for new 
ages, the goal remains the same: develop the habits of the good and thinking citizen in 
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